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Abstract

One of the crucial preconditions for growth in the East Asian Economic Miracle were high levels
of human capital, yet an explanation for their origin has not been forthcoming in the economic literature. This project investigates the origin of these high levels of human capital in South Korea through
the frameworks of induced development and labor-intensive growth. By examining both long-term
processes and the effect of policies during the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) in the Korean
countryside, it’s argued that labor-intensive modes of production, particularly in the case of rice cultivation, induced changes in economic preferences and behaviors. These shifts encouraged household
investment in education. A working definition of labor-intensive growth is constructed and employed
with data from Japanese archival, census, and survey documents for a cross-sectional regression analysis. Though in many cases labor intensity was shown to have a correlation with education, the effects
were strongly differentiated by sex and by region. Further research should focus on different ways
labor-intensive growth affects male and female workers.
Keywords: Korea, Education, Colonial, Labor Intensive
JEL Classifications:
N35 Economic History: Labor and Consumers • Demography • Education
Q15 Agricultural and Natural Resources: Land Ownership and Tenure • Land Use • Agriculture
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1

Introduction

With the rise of the Asian tiger economies in the 1960’s in East and Southeast Asia and their subsequent
expansion, the idea of a unified Asian model of development as an alternative to the dominant Washington
consensus held high hopes. Much of the discussion of the model focused on the fact that in many of
the ‘miracle growth’ countries, the public sector had extensively intervened in the market for a number of
goals including targeting high-growth industries, encouraging exports, and ensuring a high level of equity1
. Critics however have questioned the effectiveness of these interventions, arguing that the so-called
‘development state’ either pushed along economic processes that were already on-going or that unique
institutional factors prevent it from being successfully replicated. In an attempt to ground the development
state in historical processes, Kohli (1994) argued for the latter and presented evidence that the origin
behind South Korea’s efficient public sector was a strong state-society tie created by the Japanese colonial
state (1910-1945)2 . Subsequently Duol Kim & Ki-Joo Park (2008) argued for the former, pointing to the
independent rise of industrial activity during the period of Japanese rule3 . Similar historical investigations
of Japan, China, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia also show peculiar institutions and antecedents of growth of
the post-war development state4 .
Defining the development state has proved a challenge. The simplest definition, a state that allows
for rapid economic growth, is inadequate because it fails to integrate institutional and historical contexts.
Defining the development state based on outcomes robs the term of any analytic framework. Looking
within the historical and institutional contexts there are several similar characteristics between countries
commonly associated as development states that should be emphasized. Evans (1995), in addressing the
1 See MacDonald, Lawrence, ed.,”The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, Main Report (English)”, A
World Bank Policy Research Report, New York, New York: Oxford University Press (1993), pg. 1-402.
2 Kohli, Atul, ”Where Do High Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of Korea’s ’Developmental
State’, World Development, 22(9), (1994): 1269-293.
3 Kim, Duol, and Ki-Joo Park, “Colonialism and Industrialization: Factory Labor Productivity of Colonial Korea, 1913-37”,
Australian Economic History Review, 48(1), (2008): 26-46.
4 See Chalmers (1982) for Japan, Elvin (1972), Pomeranz (2000), and Landes (2006) for China
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differences between development and predatory states, connected the “structural characteristics of states”
to their development outcomes. He argued that “embedded autonomy”, that is when bureaucrats are both
committed to a cohesive set of goals (allowing for autonomy) and are subject to complex social ties allowing for decentralized social processes to exert their presence, is a fundamental component of a development
state5 . That doesn’t mean that the state must be an activist one: the set of bureaucratic goals may be to
limit regulation, as is at times the mandate given to US agencies. It does however provide for an expanded
role for bureaucrats than previously envisioned. As such many countries who have attempted to copy
the formula to get on the development train overemphasize this expanded role by having a bureaucracy
too autonomous without compensated embeddedness to act as a check. Suharto’s Indonesia and Marcos’
Philippines were prime examples of states where bureaucratic governments that tried to replicate the successes of the development states were captured by an inner circles of elites. The results, less than satisfying
the precision of interventions of development states, often backfired and stalled growth for decades.
Engerman & Sokoloff (2002)6 argued that governments which form under initial conditions of inequality will result in the capture of the state by elites who will attempt to constrict political, economic,
and educational equity to engage in rent-seeking behavior. This will prevent the economy from engaging in development because of a lack of mass participation in economic growth as the economy will be
strongly segmented by social groups. However, if equity can be encouraged in these fields then society and
market will be less segmented. This will also mean that all groups in society will be better embedded in it.
Consider that when education is restricted to a small group, that group will share strong networks within
itself and few with other sections of society. The bureaucracy will almost have no choice but to consist
of these members. Yet when education is widespread, not only can the bureaucracy be recruited from
different segments of society, but tighter networks allow for decentralized social changes to have greater
5 Evans,

Peter B. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University Press,
1995 (pg 12).
6 Engerman, Stanley L. and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, ”Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New
World Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper Series, 9259, (Oct. 2002), pg 1-43.
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impact on public policy. Surveying the group of Asian development states, Rodrik (1994) remarked that
“[a]round 90 percent or more of the growth of Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Thailand can be ‘accounted’
for by these countries’ exceptionally high levels of primary school enrollment and equality around 19607 .”
Figure I: The Development State

Hence, education and equity are vital requirements of a successful developmental state. They allow
for both a counterbalance to a closed elite and for broad participation in the modern economy. Education
in particular seems to be vital in this case where governments that target high growth industries engaged in
technologically complex production, such as cars and computer chips, require workers to be engineers in
the production process. Yet as much as Asian development seems synonymous with investment in human
capital, this wasn’t always the case. Asia has for most of history largely lagged behind Western Europe and
its offshoots in literacy. In Meiji era Japan (1868-1912), surveys in five prefectures noted that the ability
to sign one’s name varied from 64% in Shiga prefecture in central Japan, to as low as 18% in the southern
Kagoshima prefecture. Only 6.8% could read common public notices and certificates8 . When discussing
mid-19th century Qing China, which was one of “[f]ew societies [to] have ever put more emphasis on the
value of education in its various forms”, Westad (2012) recorded that between 1/3-1/2 of men and up to
7 Rodrik,

Dani, ”King Kong Meets Godzilla: The World Bank and The East Asian Miracle”, CEPR Discussion Papers, no.
944 (1994): 1-42.
8 Yakuwa, Tomohiro, ”Literacy in Tokugawa Japan, Japanese Journal of Educational Research, Japanese Educational Research Association 70:4 (2003). pg. 524-535.
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1/10 of women were literate. That’s, at most, 30% of the population9 . A 1939 census in Thailand revealed
that as much as 68.8% of the population was illiterate10 . Conditions in South Korea were even worse.
One statistic claims that only 22% of residents of South Korea were literate as late as 194511 . That’s not
for understanding thousands of complex characters. That’s for recognizing Hangul, which has one of the
world’s easiest to learn writing systems. Meanwhile, literacy in the entirety of Britain and Sweden in the
late 19th century was approaching 80%. France was gaining on 70% and the Netherlands had reached
modernity with 90% literacy12 . Then, something moved, the gears shifted, and convergence occurred.
Japan led the literacy charge and by the end of World War II the percentage of those who couldn’t read
or write kanji fell to just 2.1%13 . In post-war China, literacy rose from a measly 20% in 1950 to 66% by
198214 . South Korea was perhaps the most impressive (reliable data on the North is scant). From 22% in
1945, the country’s literacy rate grew astronomically, reaching 71% in 1960 and 88% by 197015 .
Though Rodrik argued that education, specifically primary school enrollment rates, explained high
growth, education enrollment itself cannot account for any of it. The skills and knowledge one gains in
education, such as literacy, are the actual drivers of growth. Those countries that Rodrik noted had a high
primary school enrollment rate were able to achieve their substantial rise in literacy rates in the post-war
directly through enrollment in schools where children were taught basic literacy skills. That is not to say
that all gains in literacy are achieved solely through the establishment of new schools. The rise of literacy
in Europe between the 16th-19th centuries was largely achieved without centralized schooling. Instead,
much of it was driven by religious societies and fueled by the spread of the printing press. However,
9 Westad,

Odd Arne. Restless empire: China and the world since 1750. New York: Basic Books, 2015.
World Illiteracy at Mid-Century: A Statistical Study. Vol. 11. 11 vols. Monographs on Fundamental Education
. UNESCO, 1957.
11 Chang, Ha-Joon. Bad samaritans: the myth of free trade and the secret history of capitalism. New York, NY: Bloomsbury
Press, 2009.
12 Buringh & Van Zanden (2009), Van Zandel et al (2014), OxLAD, Broadberry & O’Rourke (2010).
13 Yakuwa, 2003
14 Ross, Heidi, ”China Country Study”, UNESCO Background Paper for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report:
Literacy for Life, (2005), pg. 1-116
15 Mason, Edward S. et al., ”The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea”, Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Asia Center, 1980.
10 UNESCO.
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literacy in East and Southeast Asia didn’t noticeably increase until the post-war period when mandatory
primary schooling became widespread. Thus, it’s reasonable to assume that this was the primary channel
to literacy. Even Japan, which was the first to experience a rise in literacy in the late 19th century, saw
mandatory schooling laws implemented in the previous generation. Therefore, investment in education
must have proceeded rises in literacy. Yet Roderik cites 1960 enrollment levels as the impetus for growth,
even though increases in literacy had reached their greatest momentum by then. This means that to investigate the source of South Korea’s post-war literacy boom, one place to start would be to look for a pre-war
enrollment boom.
Before moving on, an additional factor needs to be addressed. Schooling, despite the protest of
social critics, is a service sold on the market16 . It requires producers to supply it and consumers to demand
it. Education is special in that most of the cost of it is borne by governments who consider an educated
population as a requirement for economic growth and political order. Where the public sector has established enough schools to reasonably expect attendance, it will begin to mandate a certain number of years
of primary schooling. Even in this case however, public officials walk a fine line because opportunity
costs and preferences can still override policy goals. If take up is very low, enforcement can be all but
impossible. Therefore, there must exist sustained demand by consumers of education (i.e. households) in
order for the public provisioning of education to be utilized. There are three distinct components to this
demand: The reward for education must exceed the perceived opportunity costs, the reward for education
must be known, and children must have an ability and interest in learning. An affinity for long-term planning as well as placing an inherent moral value on education outside of economic benefit can cause the
first component to vary, while broader social networks can help spread information about the outcomes of
education. The third component is particularly fickle and rarely considered. However, students who are
16 For

an example of such an approach, see Becker, Gary S., et al., ”The Market for College Graduates and the Worldwide
Boom in Higher Education of Women”, American Economic Review, 100(2), (May 2010), pp. 229-233.
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the first in their family to become literate have little support when completing a frustrating assignment.
With few people to help them and family members sensing their difficulty, students may give up early,
deciding that education is simply something they’re incapable of. Factors affecting take-up had for many
years been assumed to naturally occur by development economists, but this is clearly not the case17 . Often
families hold children back because they need the extra labor in the house. Even if they don’t, getting
student to maintain education gains with year-round engagement is unlikely to occur. Cultural norms also
prevent girls in many cultures from attending classes. Schools have had to bribe families with free lunches
and clothing, and even then successes have been slim. South Korea and Asia in general thus stand out for
how quickly demand responded to a growth in supply.
This study argues that the origin of this rapid take-up of education is tied to institutions prevailing
in the Korean countryside in the pre-war era which stimulated demand for education much before it was
adequately supplied by the South Korean government. Yet the effects on the Korean countryside were not
maintained within it. The 1960’s and 1970’s constituted a period of rapid demographic changes. Millions
moved into urban areas, especially Seoul, such that from 1966-1970 the proportion of the population living
in urban population grew by 50% and had nearly doubled to 57.3% by 198018 . Though these people now
found themselves in a new environment, they retained the same preferences and levels of human capital
as they had while working in the countryside. Their high demand for education thus should be able to be
traced to rural and agricultural development.
17 See

Chapter 4, ”Top of the Class” in Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo, ”Poor Economics, London: Penguin Books,
2012.
18 Rii, Hae Un, and Jae-Seob Ahn, ”Urbanization and its Impact on Seoul, Korea”, Chung-hua Institution for Economic
Research, UN NGO Policy Series, (2002), pg 1-24.
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2

Theoretical Framework

The role of agriculture in development has historically been marginalized, being considered simply a traditional mode of production. Thinking in terms of economic sectors can be said to have begun with Karl
Marx, who saw different stages of development based on “changes in production technology and associated changes in the system of property rights and ideology” motivated through competition between two
classes19 . Agricultural production, dominated by a feudalistic economic system, would, in this framework, be gradually replaced by industrial production as capitalists struggled with the proletariat over the
means of production. However, by the time of Marx’s writing, feudalism and agriculture seemed to be
becoming increasingly fragments of the past. Friedrich List meanwhile argued for domestic industrial
expansion as the prime mover of all sectors, including agricultural, of the economy. He saw more of a
symbiosis between the industrial and agricultural sectors. Industrial growth both increased demand for
agricultural products and provided more technologically advanced inputs for the sector. Agriculture in
turn held a large population that provided a market for industrial goods20 . Starting in the 1930’s, in the
footsteps of the German historical school, Allan Fisher and Colin Clark divided the economy into primary,
secondary, and tertiary sectors. They presented data they purported showed that economic progress would
be achieved through the transfer of investment and productivity growth followed by labor from each sector
to the next. Thus governments focused on the transfer of resources from agriculture to industry, with the
former seen as lacking any capability of future economic growth. The country thus able to sustain itself
with the lowest percentage of labor in agriculture would have to be judged as the most advanced21 . In
light of the dynamic growth witnessed in the post-war period, an alternative conception of development
was formulated by Rostow. Mainly concerned with “deceleration” of growth, he argued that declining
19 Hayami

Yujiro & Vernon W. Ruttan, ”Agricultural Development: An International Perspective, Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1971 (pg. 11).
20 Ibid, 12
21 Ibid, 13
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prices and income elasticities would cause stagnation in each successive sector unless technology could
allow for new sectors to emerge. He however saw a need for a strong agricultural sector, not only as the
driving force for predominantly agricultural economies, but also for its ability to provide food, a mass
market for goods, capital investment, and a labor force22 .
Another framework popular among economists for analyzing the role of agriculture in development
has been the dual sector model. Lewis (1954) stated the foundations of the model as the interaction
between a larger and stagnant agricultural sector and a small, but thriving industrial one23 . As he argued, a
rural sector with a large surplus of labor may have marginal labor productivity near zero, or at least below
subsistence levels. Moreover, wages are determined within the agricultural sector itself, meaning that they
approximate the marginal productivity of labor in that sector alone. This is because all opportunities to
use labor in agriculture have been exhausted and what is left to do has only marginal significance. The
result is a large amount of excess and idle labor. With the first investments in industrial capacity in the
urban area, destitute peasants would be able to increase their wage by moving to the urban sector. As they
resettle, marginal labor productivity in the rural sector rises, but output remains the same. This provides
for an agricultural surplus that can be invested into the urban sector. However, though industrialists had
been able to take advantage of the low rates of marginal productivity in the countryside to lower wages and
gain higher profits to reinvest into production, their ability to extract profits gradually decrease. The urban
sector must then constantly compete with the rural sector through increasing productivity. However, as it
will be argued, applying this model in Asia presents an issue since there was rarely an idle surplus of labor
in the countryside. Every worker had their own role in the cultivation process and thus their departure
would have caused a fall in yields. Jorgenson (1961) pushed against the assumptions of zero marginal
productivity and wages that are determined through segmented sectors24 . Since any movement of labor
22 Ibid,

14
Arthur, ”Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor”, Manchester School of Economics and Social
Studies, 22, (May 1954), pg 139-91.
24 Jorgenson, Dale, ”The Development of a Dual Economy, The Economic Journal, 71(282), (June 1961), pg 309-334.
23 Lewis,
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from the agricultural to the urban sector results in a fall in output, there must be productivity change in the
agricultural sector to compensate for this decline25 .
There are two main issues with the above formulation that undermine its viability, particularly in the
Asia context. First, it imagines productivity gains as smooth transitions that have no institutional effects on
production. However, productivity gains have been historically difficult to achieve, even with the proper
incentives. When they do arrive, their effects on the various factors of production can be quite considerate.
Second, it supposes a seamless transfer of labor and capital between the urban to the rural sector. Within
the processes of development in Asia, the two sectors cannot be viewed as interchangeable; it expends
a of of extra energy to move goods from one sector to the other.26 Hayami and Ruttan (1971) realized
the weaknesses of such a model early on and presented an alternative conception which they termed the
induced development model. Under such a framework development in the traditional agricultural sector is
fueled by technological inputs from the urban sector while also supporting it with an agricultural surplus.
Growth in the traditional sector is induced through two basic needs: either to save labor or to conserve
land. However, the researchers realized that technical advancement on its own cannot induce development.
Instead, the model “involves an adaptive response on the part of cultural, political, and economic institutions, in order to realize the growth potential opened up by new technical alternatives27 .” If the institutions
cannot adapt to the consequences of technical innovation, then this innovation will be stalled indefinitely.
Critical components contributing to this institutional flexibility include “investments in general education”
and “an effective system of market and non-market information linkages28 ”. The researchers borrowed
and adapted extensively from previous models of development to build this framework. Interestingly, they
claimed that their focus on institutional change was inspired by Marxist analysis.
25 Hayami
26 Ibid,

24
27 Ibid, 4
28 Ibid, 5

& Ruttan, 23
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2.1

Labor Intensive Industrialization

Labor intensive industrialization (LII) has been advocated for as an alternative to the dual sector economy;
in many ways it is a variant on the induced development model. LII is based on the argument that Asia
used labor, rather than land or capital, as its source of competitive advantage29 . The need to conserve a
particular factor of production was also a key motivation in the induced development model. One major
reason that Asia may have had an abundance of labor, and hence a need to conserve the other factors, is the
spread of the rice crop. Vollrath (2011) connected the abundance of labor to the labor-intensive cultivation
of rice. In cultivating rice, he argued, one would discover that the “diminishing returns to labor are less
pronounced”30 in this crop. The reasons for this will be explored further, but for now it’s important to note
that marginal labor productivity will take much longer to approach zero in the rice economy than in the
classically modeled agricultural economy. As a result, more labor can be employed than in with alternative
crops. The relative abundance of labor encouraged the adoption of certain techniques of production rather
than others, resulting in a path of technological development different from the capital and land intensive
one that formed the basis of Europe’s industrial revolution. Specifically, labor intensive industrialization
encouraged the diversification of economic activities, investment in skill, and sustained economic inclusiveness. This speaks to the adaptive institutional response advocated by the induced developed model.
Before Vollrath, the role of rice in promoting LII was formulated Francesca Bray (1986), who proposed a distinct path of development for rice economies when she suggested that rice cultivation encourages “alternative paths of technological development”31 . Bray argued that this concept better explained
the historical narrative of development within Asia than did neoclassical economics. For instance, the
question of the cause of economic divergence between China and Western Europe is a major one within
29 Austin,

Gareth, and Kaoru Sugihara, ”Labour-intensive Industrialization in Global History”, New York: Routledge, 2015.

30 Vollrath, Dietrich, ”The Agricultural Basis of Comparative Development”, Journal of Economic Growth, 16(4), (Dec 2011),

pg. 343-370.
31 Bray, Francesca, ”The Rice Economies: Technology and Development in Asian Societies, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
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economic historiography32 . However, Bray termed the divergence in living standards between them a ”red
herring” in the overall study of economic history. Instead of viewing the increase in living standards in a
linear fashion, Bray instead focused on the technological paths underpinning these living standards. Although it would later help bring about fast paced growth, this was not the economic goal of actors within
the labor-intensive economy. Instead, it was to transform production to expand the potential of rice cultivation to absorb more labor. Thus, the technological apex achieved by China in the 13th century and the
subsequent decline was the result of a continuing transformation of patterns of production rather than of a
collapse. Thomas C. Smith’s (1959) seminal study into Japan’s agricultural transition during the Edo period also implicitly focused on technological paths of development by discussing exchanges of labor and
capital that fueled the “growth of the market”33 . Specifically, it was the labor requirements of rice which
encouraged both economic inclusion and entrepreneurial behavior. Hence, though Edo Japan may have
had comparably low living standards, it was engaged in an agricultural revolution, though of a different
sort, contemporaneously with England.
Meanwhile Douangngeune, Hayami, & Godo (2004), focusing on differences in rice yields, argued
that Thailand’s abundant land resources resulted in “slower educational development”34 . While the government invested in education, take-up was relatively slow, something the authors attribute to abundant
land which “could be readily exploited by traditional technology.” Land abundance, combined with labor
scarcity, may have also fueled growth in the early United States according to Habakkuk (1962). He argued
that with a greater opportunity cost to abandoning agriculture on account of land abundance, industrial
wages increased, resulting in the greater substitution of labor for capital35 . Agriculture thus, outside of
32 Pritchett,

L, ”Divergence, Big Time”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, (1997) 3-17; Acemoglu, D., Simon Johnson, & James A. Robinson, ”Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income
Distribution”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, (2002), 1231-1279.
33 Smith, Thomas C., ”The Agrarian origins of Modern Japan, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959.
34 Douangngeune, Bounlouane & Yujiro Hayami & Yoshihisa Godo, ”Education and Natural Resources in Economic Development: Thailand Compared with Japan and Korea, Journal of Asian Economics, 16, (2005), pg. 179-204.
35 Habakukk, John, ”American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century, London: Cambridge University Press,
1962.
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furnishing a labor force for the industrial sector, shapes the development of this sector.
An argument based on land abundance however differs from that of one based on botany, though
there are important interactions between the two that will later be mentioned. There are several taxonomic
characteristics of rice which may affect paths of technological development. Though upland varieties
exist, the majority of rice is grown in paddies flooded by water ranging from about 30 centimeters to two
meters in depth in the case of floating rice. Land that has been worked as paddy is usually highly valued
and the conversion of land from dry field to wetland has been a common way to increase yields. Like
in England, where complex rules governed access to pasture, complex relations and disputes over access
to water were embedded in social relations. Not only was access necessary, but water levels needed to
be managed through systems of irrigation, drainage, and flood control. A major advantage for Asian rice
cultivators compared to Western cultivators of dry grains was that they did not require a crop rotation
system in order to prevent nutrient depletion. The nutrients from the water and naturally growing algae
however kept paddy land fertile while rice was being cultivated. This allowed for the same plots to be used
year-out. Moreover, rice does respond well to intercropping as the planting of a winter crop requires the
paddy to be drained and reworked.
While many other relevant characteristics of rice cultivation will be explored, the main argument
is that rice is distinguished as a labor-intensive crop and thus engenders a labor-absorbing path of development. Labor intensive is a relative term detailing a process of production that fulfills two conditions:
First, increasing the supply of labor results in a commensurate increase in land productivity so that labor
productivity remains constant in the manner described by Boserup (1965)36 . This is the case in most preindustrial economies, but simply put, “returns to labor diminish more slowly in rice production than in
wheat production” (Vollrath, 2011). Note that subsequent discussion of land and labor productivity will
36 Boserup,
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be referring to its value within rice cultivation; it will be noted if the comparison is for any other agricultural commodity. Second, any increases in capital inputs are ones that preserve rather than replace labor
inputs, such as irrigation as opposed to the ox plough. This is not to say that other factor interactions don’t
exist in rice cultivation. In early stages or when land is abundant, increases in labor supply may result in
constant land and labor productivity. In a highly interconnected economy, increasing labor supply may
decrease land productivity as individuals optimize to work in rural industries. Modern cultivation might
also employ labor replacing capital, such as tractors, when resources allow. What matters however is that
they are all derivative of the labor-intensive system. This then sets the frame for future development.
The major reason why rice becomes a labor-intensive crop is the way that the cultivation system
adapts to increasing labor. Within the range of a few weeks, land has to flooded and the rice sown individually while wading through deep water and thick clay. In the next couple of months, water levels need to
be maintained and weeds removed until when the plants can be individually harvested. Moreover, putting
more work into any of these steps results in a much higher yield. Rice can initially be grown in nurseries,
it can be planted in a narrower timeframe, it can be more tightly sown, weeds can be better removed,
organic fertilizers can be produced, it can be harvested faster to allow for a second crop or dry grains to be
planted, and new seed varieties can be developed among other techniques. Most of these inputs are easily
divisible, straightening bottlenecks in the process. The abundance of labor meanwhile keeps wages low
and makes labor-replacing capital ineffective.
The labor intensive process encourages a path of technological development with four key components: a rise in the carrying capacity and hence productivity of land, labor diversification, the accumulation
of skills, and the tendency towards economic inclusion. What is meant by a higher carrying capacity of
land is that, given some percentage of arable land cultivated with rice, the corresponding expected population density in that area will be higher than if the rice was replaced with dry grains. This doesn’t mean
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that all regions which grow rice will have higher pre-industrial population densities, only that they have
the potential to. Land constraints, primarily topographical, but also political and social, will determine
whether land is abundant and hence whether labor-intensive rice cultivation will take advantage of the
higher carrying capacity. Higher population density can have several benefits. It can encourage the creation of a centralized state through higher tax revenues which can protect against invasions, enforce a legal
framework, and maintain infrastructure. Since the flow of goods will be larger, it may also increase the
number and the relative integration of markets. Finally, higher population densities in rice cultivation promotes the disintegration of large landholdings in favor of family cultivated plots, unlike that of dry grains.
Monitoring workers is difficult and skills (discussed later) are required to be developed so that revenues
can be maximized. Consequently, tenant relations replace manorial much earlier.
Labor diversification, or what Francks (2000) terms the “pluri-active household”37 , is another byproduct of labor-intensive cultivation. Specifically, the seasonal demands of labor allow for slack periods
when activity outside of rice cultivation can be pursued. This can include the cultivation of crops outside
of rice, but might also influence the emergence of rural industries such as textiles. If markets are relatively
integrated, then this allows families to benefit from productivity growth in a growing industrial sector
while remaining engaged in agriculture. This provides added stability so that in the case when agricultural
prices collapse, households could more easily transfer their labor to industrial activity. There was little
separation of the worker from their means of production. Certainly this was less the case once interest rates
fall and urban economies of scale were taken advantage of, yet even then the majority of firms tended to
have fewer employees, reflecting the continuity of the household framework.
The third component was the creation of a skilled labor force. Agricultural labor, argued Saito
(2013), was not “abundant, homogeneous, and disposable”, but conditioned by experiences with cultiva37 Francks,
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(2000), pg. 43-52
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tion and social institutions38 . It was not abundant and it in fact often experienced shortages in the peak
growing season. Labor was also not disposable, but embedded into social relations reinforced by obligations in mutually beneficial exchanges. Focusing on the supposed homogeneity of labor, Saito argued
that the continual refinement of skill and technique within the rice economy imbued rural workers with an
affinity for industrial work in the post-war. Cultivators had to learn how to best work their land, negotiate
rights to and maintain complex irrigation facilities, and invent new intercropping patterns in order to support an increasing population. This experience may have led to a better understanding of the benefits of
long-term investments (especially in education), innovation, product differentiation, time discipline, and
cooperation among others. The capacity of rice economies in the post-war, even during their “development
stage”, to produce technically complex goods for export, including cars and electronics, might be argued
as a direct consequence of the development of skill in agriculture.
The final component in the model relates to inclusiveness in the relationship between tenants and
landlords. This point may come as a surprise since social relations in traditional Asian rice economies were
certainly not based on a concept of equality of outcome or even that of opportunity. Privacy was tenuous.
Mentions of banishment and ostracism from social superiors were feared. The majority had no say in
community affairs. Yet membership in a rigid social hierarchy presented opportunities with itself within
the rice economy. Labor requirements meant that the most well-to-do depended the most on the diligent
and skilled work of tenants, or often extended family members. It was incumbent on them to ensure that
those working their fields were the most skilled, giving them an incentive to transfer techniques. During
the off-season, landlords would have to decrease their rents to encourage tenants to drain and work the
land. As a result of these close ties, landlords saw it in their interest to provide access to capital to their
cultivators. By having them learn how to use more advanced techniques on their own farms, they would be
38 Saito,
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more able to provide more productive labor when it was most necessary. This would gradually spread to
the sharing of power looms and other capital for the various industries the pluri-active household engaged
in. Thus, though land may have been unequally divided, the organization of labor preserved a high level
of economic inclusion.
We use this path of technological development to model growth in colonial Korea. Increases in
carrying capacity, labor diversification, skill development, and economic inclusion, as the pre-requisites
for development in the rice economy, are hence the criteria used to judge economic growth under Japanese
colonialism. The question then is whether these criteria developed further under Japanese rule than they
would have without it. If Japanese intervention can be shown to have had a positive influence on these four
parameters compared to what would be the alternative, then one can argue that the Japanese established the
necessary conditions for post-war growth. Living standards measured in purchasing power may thus be
decreasing, but this would be a “red herring” according to Francks. The changes would either be caused
by random exogenous events or by the criteria reaching different stages of development. If the other
criteria experiencing expansion, then this will be the main cause of long-term growth in living standards.
It is nevertheless still crucial to connect these criteria to actual growth in the postwar. Evidence is hence
provided from secondary sources that estimate the significance of the contribution of these components to
post-war growth is provided in the final chapter.
The overall theory used to justify the argument presented in this thesis can be summarized using
the above diagram. Intensive rice cultivation can result in social reorganization which allows for more
efficient production. This process, labeled A, requires the society to have a certain amount of flexibility and
openness to entrepreneurship. Otherwise, economic stagnancy can overtake the rice economy resulting in
agricultural involution. This we term the high level equilibrium trap. Korea was able to avoid the trap for
several reasons, principally from the relative weakness and involvement of the elite in agriculture.
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Figure II: Labor Intensive Growth

Korea under Japanese colonialism offers a relatively unexplored opportunity to test the claims of
this model. One glaring issue with it is that not every rice economy has been equally successful at translating labor-intensive industrialization into development. Asia offers some of the world’s most glaring
inequalities in prosperity between countries, where crossing a border may seem like entering a different
world. Even historical differences between advanced economies such as Japan and China put into question
the existence of a model of growth that supposedly doesn’t require any external forces to push through its
various stages. It must then be the case that other factors, whether randomly present at the outset, or the
result of exogenous forces, allowed for some rice economies to succeed in the major transitions by overcoming certain bottlenecks in the model. Korea is a good context to examine what these bottlenecks could
have been and how they might be overcome. It is not clear how successfully Korea, not having undergone
Japanese colonialism in the early 20th century, would have overcome bottlenecks to develop in the postwar era. It may have in fact done just as well if not better given the disruptions of colonialism. However,
it could have also done worse, perhaps resembling the less developed economies of Southeast Asia with
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their lower education levels and greater corruption. To ideally test the effectiveness of the treatment, i.e.
the set of Japanese interventions in the agricultural economy, a treatment and control group should be constructed to control for selection bias and confounding variables, with differences between the two groups
examined after the experimentation period. Unfortunately, neither would a randomized control trial have
been feasible, nor is there the semblance of historical experimentation. To evaluate claims made about
an alternative Korea, the project asks whether the peninsula, at the onset of Japanese colonialism, more
closely resembled the lower Yangtze delta in China or a Japan simply a generation or more behind. If the
former, then it’s likely the push from Japan was necessary to set Korea on the trajectory we find it today.
If the latter, then at best Japan simply accelerated the pace of growth in Korea; at worst it may have stalled
it from catching up to Japan sooner.

2.2

Role of Japanese Colonialism

Myers & Yamada in The Japanese Colonial Empire (1984) loosely identified five initiatives of Meiji Agrarian Policy that were transplanted from mainland Japan to the Korean Peninsula and implemented over the
course of the colonial period. These were (1) a land survey, (2) opening of new land, (3) introduction of
new technologies, (4) investment in market and transportation infrastructure, and (5) the establishment of
local agricultural bureaus.
The land survey initiated in 1911 and completed in 1918 not only defined boundaries and ownership of land, but linked this registry to a national database of citizens to allow for continual updating of
records. The survey served several goals of imperial Japan. First and foremost it allowed Japan to extract
more wealth through land taxes, especially from properties that had been previously hidden under Joseon
surveys (up to 50 % of land)39 , and to simplify the tax code. It also allowed wealth to be extracted more
39 Yoo
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reliably by replacing a series of output taxes with a single land tax. While the previous Korean government
had determined state expenditures based on revenue for a specific year, the Japanese sought a tax base that
would allow them to make long-term financial commitments. The tax system they implemented thus mirrored the kokudaka system used during the Edo era by examining land characteristics to assess a tax based
how much rice the land could be reasonably expected to produce. This also added stability for household
expenditures since the sum that had to be paid was already known. Such a reform may have encouraged
cultivators to work land more intensely since they would pay less of their income in taxes given a larger
harvest. The Japanese government also stipulated that the land tax had to be paid with cash, as opposed to
rice as had been traditionally the case. This condition gave cultivators more incentive to sell more of their
goods in the market for cash. It also made it easier to diversify away from rice to other produce such as
beans or fishing, or even rural industry such as sericulture.
A major criticism coming from Korean national historians was that the land survey allowed for
expropriation from illiterate peasants to Japanese settlers and corporations40 . There are several pieces of
evidence to support this claim. Even before colonization, the Japanese government had been pushing to
allow Japanese citizens to purchase cheap land in Korea. Though few Japanese settled in the peninsula,
by the close of the colonial period, Japanese settlers, corporations, and the colonial government held up to
a quarter of land41 . Japanese officials also used the survey to deduce which land belonged to government
bureaucrats and members of the royal family, later confiscating it and selling it to corporations such as
the Oriental Development Company. However, other historians dispute this claim on two charges: (1) the
transfer of land to Japanese landlords that did occur was primarily caused by the depression of the 1930’s,
and (2) where Korean landlords were supplanted by Japanese ones, their impact was largely negligible42 .
Though land markets were not well established in the pre-colonial period, it is certain that “tenure was
40 Shin,

Peasant Protest and Social Change in Colonial Korea (40).
Clark W. Korean Studies 20 (1996): 262-65. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23719613.
42 Gragert (2).
41 Sorensen,

20
very insecure in the late Choson dynasty” such that according to Hong Songch’an’s (1986) study of land
belonging to a member of the Korean royal family, between 1896 and 1910, 28 out of 37 fields changed
tenants at least once43 . With such a record, the early colonial era seems to have ushered in a period of
stability: between surveys from 1913-1917 and those from 1918-1927, only a 2.4% increase in landless
tenants occur44 .
Most significantly however, the land survey conferred legal property rights in land to their respective
landowners. In presenting a natural experiment in the Japanese territory of Palau, a collection of islands
in the Pacific, Yoo & Steckel (2010) argued that the establishment of individual property rights there by
the Japanese government promoted “robust economic development”. Though Palau had not been viewed
as having much economic potential either by the Japanese or previous colonial forces, it was the only
state in Micronesia where boundaries of private lands and land registers were constructed before the war
halted these efforts45 . Even within Palau, they argued, one sees differences between the three states whose
land register records were misplaced or lost in transit and the rest of the island county where the rights
were upheld in US courts46 . Moving to Taiwan and Korea, they argued that well-defined rights in those
two colonies “secured land taxation and enabled farmers to obtain bank loans from capital improvements,
principally irrigation systems.” The usage of land as collateral allowed for access to credit to households
who had never before engaged with the modern financial system. Private interest rates fell from as high as
50% to between 10%-20% by the end of the colonial period47 .
The standardization of property rights may have also encouraged the growth of literacy rates since
the deed to one’s land was no longer based on verbal agreement or who worked the land, but stored in a
physical document that needed to be updated when changes were made. The ability to sign one’s name
43 Shin
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would have been important in affirming ownership. It also set a new stage for the relationship between
owners and tenants. The standardization of these rules allowed for large peasant protest movements to
form during the colonial period.
Between 1910 and 1940 the amount of paddy land in Korea grew by over 200,000 hectares and
the amount of double-cropped land grew by more than 250,000 hectares, or 250%. The result was an
increase in annual rice production from 10 to 22 million koku within the colonial period, amounting to a
2.31% increase annually. Others like Sub Park, find annual increases as high as 3.8% during the 1920’s
and 1930’s. He argued that although about 18% of this growth in output was a result of increases in
paddy land, the remaining 82% originated from growth in land productivity48 . Thus, though paddy land
increased by 30.3% over from 1911-1939, labor productivity rose by 80.6% in the same period.

2.3

Pre-Colonial Conditions

Land carrying capacity, that is, land productivity and its interaction with labor productivity, is the first
criteria to be investigated. It is certain that rice culture had, by the arrival of the Japanese, already reached
a critical point in Korea. In the capital Kyonggi province, Japanese surveyors led by Fusagirou Kabayashi
judged that in 1907 just under 3{4 of arable land had already been cultivated. Dividing the province’s
mainland into 58 blocks, they grouped land into 9 categories. Two of these comprised all currently cultivated land: paddy and farm land. Four of these were areas considered not arable: mountain regions,
regions with sandy soil, swamp, and coastal wetlands. The final three were regions which were “not yet
cultivated” and included mountainous regions, land near rivers, and land near the sea. Thus, they estimated
that 74.01% of arable land had already been cultivated by 1907. Such measures may not be accurate because of disagreements on definitions and whether land really was arable. However, they are likely to
48 A
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be precise in their comparison with domestic Japanese calculations. When making their categorizations,
the surveyors would have been familiar with more intensive methods of cultivation, such as terracing and
transplanting. There is a possibility that they may have overestimated the amount of arable land (underestimating area cultivated) since in later decades the government which commissioned their research would
push for the increased cultivation of marginal lands.
On their own, rice paddies occupied 49.31% of all arable land and constituted 66.67% of all cultivated land, i.e. 145,781 cho (1,446 km2 ). Of the 47 mainland regions (which included the closest islands),
five (10.64%) had already put 100% of arable land under the plow. They all had variable amounts of both
types of fields, mountain areas, and cultivated areas. One possibility that they were considered to have had
their entire arable land cultivated was because they were all regions bordering other provinces and thus in
the grid made by the surveyors had much less land to assess.
The remaining third of cultivated land was occupied by various other fields and gardens which grew
other grains such as wheat and millet, soy beans, and mulberry leaves for silkworms, among others. The
vast majority, 71.78%, of all land however was marked as a mountain region where agriculture could not
be established. In some districts that percentage reached almost 95%. The data doesn’t seem to suggest
that having a larger mountain region encourages a high proportion of arable land to be cultivated.
Comparisons are difficult to draw because of changing definitions, but a Japanese government account in the same year as the survey declared that around 2.9 million cho, or about 28,760 km2 of rice
had been cultivated in that year within Japan. Kyonggi’s cultivated area thus was larger than that of any
Japanese prefecture outside of the rice center of Niigata, which counted 166,780 cho of rice sown that
year. By one measure of arable land which combined pastures, forests, fields, and land for buildings,
paddy land in Japan constituted around 20% of arable land in that same year. The combined percentage
for both farms and cultivated fields was 37.24%. Taking another measure which focused on natural con-
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figuration combining lowland, upland, and hill land, rice occupied 29.15% of arable land. Japan had by
this period begun to import large quantities of rice from outside the country, particularly from Korea.
Taking a larger look at land productivity changes over the period of Japanese colonialism, one
sees what appears to be stagnancy is land productivity. It’s only in the 1930’s that land productivity
regularly exceeds 10 koku (180.4 liters) per cho (2.499 acres). Moreover, productivity seems to be of a
cyclical nature with minor booms and busts reflecting the cyclical nature of the market. There are several
ways productivity is influenced by market cycles including impacting factor inputs through fluctuations
in factor prices. Nevertheless, by the late 1930’s productivity seems to have experienced a boom with
1937 recording a harvest with 15.3 koku per cho (a 100% increase from when records begin in 1910). An
initial expansion from 1910-15 is followed by stagnation and contraction 1916-21 (though productivity
remains above the 1910-12 levels). Growth then resumes and is consistent throughout the period outside
of a contraction in 1928-1930.
Though land productivity rose in Korea during the colonial period, it barely grew as a percentage
of productivity in Japan, which by 1933 had grown to 23.26 koku per cho. The data does not support
accounts that productivity in Korea was approaching Japanese levels during the colonial era. This result is
surprising given the initial low levels of productivity in Korea which should have been easier to increase
given Japanese experimentation and investment in agriculture on the peninsula. However, comparing productivity contemporaneously between the two countries might be the most appropriate action. Japan by
the early 20th century was already in the midst of its own industrial revolution and more advanced cultivation methods generating the greatest increases in land productivity may have simply been impractical in
the more traditional Korean countryside.
From 1886-1896, land productivity in Korea cycled between 50%-60% of those in Japan(Japanese
levels were mostly stagnant). This is followed by a collapse of Japanese agriculture followed by a reemer-
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gence at a higher level of productivity in 1898. The ratio then cycles between 40%-50%, with Japanese
productivity gradually increasing before new data emerges for Korea. Given that Korea was in many
respects behind Japan in agricultural methods, it makes much more sense to compare colonial growth to
growth in Japan before the 1898 boom. Considering that this period was stagnant, any other 10-year period
in colonial Korea compares favorably to it.
There are many possible causes of this rise in land productivity, though they can be divided generally
into two categories. It may be the case that more labor is being imputed into each plot of land (i.e.
labor-absorbing agriculture) or that labor productivity has increased, allowing for a constant number of
cultivators to extract more rice from each plot. Figure 4.6 looks at the first category by plotting the number
of households engaged in agriculture on land productivity during the entire period. In labor-absorbing
agriculture, increases in labor supply should result in a linear rise in land productivity. While this does
seem to explain some of the variation in land productivity, the second category of growth, depicted in figure
7, seems to be a more accurate portrayal of what actually occurred. That is, growth in land productivity in
Korea was caused almost exclusively by growth in labor productivity rather than by an expansion of labor
supply. However, this seems to have been a transition during the early colonial period. Looking only at the
period 1910-1918, the explanatory power of labor supply on land productivity is about as strong as that of
labor productivity.
For new land to be opened, new irrigation systems had to be built and expanded. These were often
financed through loans issued by the Japanese government to those who benefited from the new systems.
The fact that there was new land to be opened signaled that Korea as a whole didn’t have as intensive of a
rice system as Japan did. In fact, average yields were 1.43 metric tons of rice per hectare in 1920 (which
compares with the statistics in the agricultural survey) compared with 2.91 in Japan. The expansion of rice
to new areas required more complex technologies. There are two distinct types of technologies that are
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important to discuss: new more productive inputs, and new techniques to use current inputs. In the former
were new seed varieties and fertilizers that would allow rice to grow in cooler climates. New seed varieties
were created at agricultural associations and experimental stations around the country and distributed to
landlords first and then to owner-cultivators, ordinary farmers, and tenant farmers. One effect of the
opening of trade and increased interaction with Japan is that rice became a globally traded commodity.
Japan looked to Korea as its grain basket as prices were much lower there than for domestic rice. This
became especially a priority after rice prices rose and chaos erupted in the streets of Tokyo in the 1918
rice riots. New infrastructure had to be developed to better transport this rice and the establishment of the
Seoul-Pusan railroad cemented this link, although the northern portion of the country would continue to be
relatively isolated. Finally, the establishment of provincial and county level agricultural bureaus created
a direct link between the state apparatus and he rural population that would, as Kohli argued, create the
deep state.
To return to the discussion on school enrollment rates and whether they were affected by Japanese
interventions in agriculture, a time period of growth needs to be established. Post-war enrollment rates
rose from 59.6% at the conclusion of the Korean War in 1953, to 77.4% in 1955, and 86.2% by 1960
(those cited by Rodrik), clocking in at an annual growth rate of 5.41%49 . As rapid as this may seem
though, this was actually slower, or at least similar, to growth in the 1930’s, which moved from 20.1% in
1933 to 42% in 1939, averaging a rate of 13.07% annually (see Figures 1.1 & 1.2)50 . An earlier peak in
growth also occurred in the period 1919-1924 when enrollment increased from 4% to 16.4% (averaging
32.49% annual growth). Though schools existed before colonialism, statistics on enrollment are currently
49 The
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unavailable. Instead, a disambiguation of literacy by age cohort is our best statistical insight to education
under Joseon Korea. It does show movement in the pre-colonial era which will be a topic addressed
later. An additional factor that the data might be missing is the closure of private schools by the Japanese
colonial regime. Though before the colonial era most schools were established through private means, a
1915 ordinance required all private schools to be certified by the colonial government. The result was a
drop in the number of schools from over 2,000 in the first few years of colonial rule to around 600 by the
mid-1920’s. However, it seems that the establishment of new public schools was able to pick up the slack:
the proportion of Koreans attending schools increased annually from 1913-1941.
While Rodrik ties the post-war economic boom to high enrollment rates in 1960, the main accomplishment of primary school, establishing literacy, had already succeeded by then. There’s a simple logic
of why the post-war surge in enrollment rates was not the cause of a tripling of literacy rates by 1960. Literacy is commonly reported as adult literacy, i.e. for everyone over 15 years of age and above. Therefore,
no one born before 1945 would be counted in the 1960 measure. Primary school in Korea traditionally
takes four years to complete, enrolling students from the ages of 6-9. Thus to be born on or before 1945
and educated during the post-war surge, thus influencing literacy through enrollment, one would have to
be born 1939-1945. To imagine that such a relatively small cohort was able to by itself cause a tripling
of the literacy rate would not be logical. The baby boom in Korea would take a few more years to kick
off; if anything, new births would have fallen during the war. What is more likely is that they had help
from an earlier cohort with similarly high enrollment rates with whom over the next 15 years became the
majority of the population. This cohort, educated during the 1933-39 boom, would have been born around
1927-1933. Thus, the education boom in post-war South Korea was founded on primary school enrollment
during the late colonial period.
Intensive rice cultivation doesn’t specifically provide for either a supply or demand for education.
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Rather, it stimulates social structures and attitudes which set the stage for demand and supply to quickly
respond to each other when changes occur. First, intensive rice cultivation exhibits constant marginal
returns which encourages farmers to work their fields throughout the year. Compare this with the peasants
of Europe who spent months idle because nothing could be planted in the off-season. Moreover, they were
faced with much fewer options during the growing season, with limited opportunities for intensification.
This produced a distinct Asian work ethic which focused on the benefits of higher labor inputs throughout
the year. A similar approach to education would be necessary. Second, intensive rice cultivation, just
as education, calls for long term investments in skills and capital. New irrigation systems, flood control
systems, draining systems, methods of transplantation, planting, weeding, new seeds, fertilizer, and many
other inputs pose risks and tradeoffs, with some output foregone in order to ensure better harvests in the
future. Third, intensive rice cultivation like education is a social process. Entire villages would need
to work together during the harvest as all extra labor was pooled together and worked on various fields
in a succession based on communal planning that had occurred during the planting season. Moreover,
many of the capital inputs required communication and cooperation among village members in order to be
successfully implemented. Similarly, the idea that it takes a village to educate a child requires similar levels
of communication and cooperation. A youth seeking education would find much greater success learning
in an area where other educated people reside. Intensive rice cultivation therefore offers a meeting of
supply and demand for skill education. On their own, these skills might not include literacy among them.
This study argues that it was the opening on trade and the commercialization of rice which established
literacy as a new requirement for economic success.
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3
3.1

Data
Literacy

The widespread definition of literacy and that used by IGOs such as the World Bank and UNESCO (and
commonly adopted by NGOs) is the proportion of those 15 years of age or older who can read and write
basic statements about their life. Variations of this definition occur, most notably being the ability to sign
one’s name, which was commonly in use is regions where the former definition was much too stringent.
For Japan, which has multiple writing systems, Kanji and Kana (i.e. Hiragana and Katakana), the term is
generally more ambiguous. Luckily, there are clues on interpretation within the terminology. The term
which Japan uses to mean literacy, 識 字, and in older documents more commonly 讀 ミ 書 キ, has a
more definite meaning than that of the more fluid ‘literacy’ in the west. 識字, or shikiji, literally means
differentiating characters, meaning the Chinese-originating kanji historically used as a style of higher
society compared to the more commonly known ‘kana’. 讀ミ書キ is even more specific in meaning the
ability to both read and write. On top of this, the census data from 1930 differentiates between being
literate in kana or in Korean hangul. The question that’s left is what consists the ability to read and write.
Different definitions, from being able to read and write one’s name, to understanding newspapers (and
replicating) newspaper articles change the interpretation of different literacy rates. When dividing literacy
rates by age groups it’s seen that about a fifth of 6-9 year olds in Korea were able to read either Kana or
Hangul. The standards used thus must not have been too challenging with only a few years of schooling
(indeed just over a fifth of elementary school students were enrolled in classes), perhaps comparable to
the current standard of composing and reading basic statements. This is useful for interpretation, though
it poses no concern in the regression model since all of the literacy data is sourced from a single document
(i.e. the 1930 census). If one views the enrollment boom of the 1930’s as the result of the meeting of the
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supply with the demand for education, then the question becomes two-fold. First, was supply, or demand,
or both that stalled until this period? Second, what changed in the environment that allowed for a new
equilibrium to emerge?
This study looks at predictors of literacy rates in 1930 and primary school enrollment rates in 1935
on the county level. Though literacy rates on the county level were previously calculated by Hong &
Paik (2017), new literacy rates, from hereon termed AKLR (Adult Korean Literacy Rate) were estimated
for two main reasons. First, instead of calculating the total literacy rate51 , this study looked at the adult
(i.e. 15 years and older) literacy rate. As explained above, this is the more common metric used by the
World Bank. It may also give a better picture of the effects of public and private investments in education
since the majority of those under the age of 15 are still accumulating literacy skills. Figure 2.1 depicts
data on literacy rates for male Koreans from the 1930 census52 . While in the older age groups the graph
shows would would expect in a country where literacy is rising, namely that age age decreases literacy
rises. Yet literacy hits its maximum in the 20-24 age group before the pattern reverses. Literacy declines
somewhat between the 20-24 and 15-19 year old group before considerably falling in the youngest two
groups. This trend is corroborated by independent census research: Figure 2.2 depicts the literacy rate for
Koreans in Keiki province, the historic center of education in the peninsula centered around the capital,
by age group. Critics of the colonial regime might use this to argue that the Japanese were repressing a
pre-colonial trend in growing literacy rates. This is certainly a possibility, however the timing makes it
unlikely. The Japanese sought to close advanced schools in the first decade of colonial rule which would
have impacted the 20-24 age group the most. By the time the members of the 15-19 age group were going
to school in the early 1920’s, elementary school enrollment was encountering its first major expansion.
51 More

accurately, 6 years and older, as reported by the 1930 census.
provided by Fight ot Justice: 日 本 軍 「 慰 安 婦 」— 忘 却 へ の 抵 抗 ・ 未 来 の 責 任 (Fight for Justice: Nihon Gun ‘Ianfu’ — Bōkyaku e no Teikō Mirai no Sekiin), a Japanese organization dedicated to preserving the memory of comfort women in the Japanese Army. Data was slightly altered for more clarity and to remove Japanese terms.
http://fightforjustice.info/?pagei d “ 3174lang “ en.
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Moreover Japanese residents in Korea, although having a much higher literacy rate, display the same trend
as do native Koreans (Figure 2.3), reaching a peak literacy in the 20-24 age group. On account of these
irregularities, this study, in estimating AKLR excluded those under 15 years of age53 . Secondly, this study
sought literacy rates for just Korean natives, disaggregating them from the Japanese resident community.
This is to address internal dynamics of the demand for education in Korea and to prevent high Japanese
literacy rates from influencing their effect.
Though ethnic data was reported on the provincial level, it wasn’t available on the county level.
Thus, rates had to be calculated for each county based on extrapolations of provincial data54 . Census data
for each county provided statistics on the number of people literate in Hangul, Kana, both, and neither.
Unfortunately, the data was not categorized by ethnicity or age. In order to only count Koreans, only
the numbers for both and Hangul were used since the number of ethnic Koreans who could only use Kana
were negligible. The census also provided county population data by age such that the population of adults
15 years of age and older could be constructed for each county. However, three issues remained with the
data. First, there may have been Japanese who were literate in both Hangul and Kana. Second, the county
literacy data did not distinguish by age, allowing literate 6-14 year-olds to be counted. Third, the county
population data did not distinguish by ethnicity. To address these issues, provincial data was extrapolated
to the county level55 . This was used to produce an estimate of the percentage of Koreans 15 years of age or
older in each county who were literate in Hangul. The steps were repeated to construct separate measures
for male and female literacy.
To cross-check the accuracy of these estimates, the AKLR was compared to that provided by Hong
53 As

a result the literacy figures in this study are generally greater than those recorded by other studies.
1930 (Shōwa 5) census was accessed through the Japanese National Diet Library Digital Collections. 13 separate
reports were published by the Governor-General’s Office (朝鮮総督府), one for each province, under the title Chōsen Kokusei
Chōsa Hōkoku. Shōwa 5 (朝鮮国勢調査報告. 昭和５年).
55 To do so, the percent of Japanese literate in both Korean and Japanese, the percentage of Koreans under 15 years of age, and
the percentage of literate Koreans who were under 15 years of age, were calculated from statistics provided for each province.
The same proportion was then equally distributed to the county level.
54 The
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& Paik (2017)56 . The researchers recorded county-level rates by disaggregating literacy in Japanese,
Korean, and both languages. However, they did not estimate literacy by ethnic group nor did they calculate
the adult literacy rate, instead sticking with the methods used by Japanese demographers. To cross-check
the data, literacy rates for Korean and both languages on the county level were combined and plotted
against AKLR. Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 show the results. The rates between counties are very similar with
R2 between 0.96 and 0.97. Since those under 15 years of age were excluded, the vast majority of counties
in the AKLR set had higher literacy rates than those in Hong & Paik57 .
One observation was that when AKLR was regressed to predict rates from Hong & Paik, the regression coefficient was not equal to 1. If the coefficient were to equal 1, then it would be as if AKLR deducted
a random portion of the rates from Hong & Paik for each county by excluding Japanese and those under
15. Since the coefficients for all three regressions were between 1.3 and 1.4 however, the amount deducted
was not random. Since AKLR rose faster, those counties with the highest AKLR saw a lower decrease
in literacy by eliminating Japanese and those under 15. Those groups must have then made up a much
smaller percentage of the literate population than they did in counties with lower literacy. Assuming that
the impact of Japanese colonists on literacy was minimal (in most counties they were 1-3% of the population), this suggests convergence in literacy throughout the peninsula as the younger generation made up a
larger proportion of the literate population in counties on the lower level.
Literacy rates for 213 counties in 1930 were tabulated in whole and by sex58 . Maps I, II, and III
depict the rates on the provincial level for the combined rate as well as for men and women, respectively.
On the provincial level, Heian Nan (38.99%) and Heian Hoku (35.89%), corresponding to present-day
56 209/213

counties were matched.
county, Yangju, in Keiki, had a higher total literacy rate. Five counties, Kilju, Shirotsu, Funei, and Mosan in in North
Kankyo, as well as Yangju, had a higher female literacy rate.
58 While the 1930 census divided the country into 234 districts, the agricultural survey which focused only on rural areas,
recorded data on 220 rural counties. Ultimately because of name changes and redistricting, 213 counties were matched from
the census and agricultural survey. Urban areas, including Seoul, Incheon, Pusan, and Mukpo are therefore excluded from this
analysis. Urbanization occurred during the late Joseon when 3% of the population lived in urban areas, and extended into the
colonial era such that by 1940 11.6% of the population was located in urban areas.
57 One
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South Pyongan and North Pyongan & Chagang provinces in North Korea, respectively, had the highest total literacy rates. These were followed by Kokai (34.15%, present-day North & South Hwangae),
Keiki (33.76%, Kyonggi), and Kankyo Haku (32.79%, North Hamgyong). The least literate were Keisho
Hoku (22.42%) and Keisho Nan (23.01%), corresponding to present-day North Gyeongsang and South
Gyeongsang provinces in South Korea respectively, Chusei Hoku (26.25%, North Chungcheong), Zenra
Nan (26.91%, South Jeolla), and Kogen (27.14%, presently divided between Gangwon in South Korea &
Kangwon in North Korea). Of the top 10% most literate counties, 8 were in Heian Nan, 5 each were in
Heian Haku and Keiki, 2 were in Kokai, and one was in Kogen. The combined literacy data appeared
normally distributed, but by conducting a shapiro-wilk test it was revealed to not be normally distributed
at a 95% confidence level. The distribution itself however is approximately symmetrical (skewness of
0.306).This contrasts with data for female literacy which was neither normally distributed nor symmetrical, but moderately right-skewed with a skewness parameter of 0.637. Male literacy was the most symmetrical with a skewness parameter of 0.264. The mean county literacy rate was 29.67%. It’s notable
that out of the five most literate provinces, all outside of Keiki (the province containing the capital) were
located in the northern half of the country.
There was a clear spatial divide in literacy rates between sexes. In some counties up to 3{4 of men
were literate and almost nowhere were less than 1{3 of men in this category. Yet female literacy, outside
of one county (Gimpo, 24%) near the capital, was never more than 1{5 and dipped as low as 2% in some
areas. The mean male literacy rate was 49.94% and the mean female rate was 8.68%. This is similar to the
Qing-era Chinese literacy rates observed by Westad. Surprisingly, there did not seem to be a correlation
between male and female literacy rates. While male literacy followed a similar geographic distribution
as total literacy, being concentrated in the northern half of the country, female literacy did not. Instead,
the provinces with the highest rates bunched along the southwestern coast of the country. One county in
Heian Nan had a male literacy rate of 73% and a paltry female literacy rate of 5%. Thus, it seems likely
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that different factors affect female and male literacy rates. A factor that could be contributing to this effect
is that in every province literate women under 15 years of age made up a much higher proportion of their
respective population than did men and thus a higher proportion were excluded from these figures. In fact,
the provinces with the lowest female literacy rates, Kankyō Nan (4.2%) and Kankyō Hoku (5.56%) also
had the highest percentage of literate women between the ages of 6-14 at 36.7% and 35% respectively.
That is, of all literate women in Kankyo Nan, 36.7% of ten were between the ages of 6-14.
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3.2

Labor Intensity

A labor intensive path of growth was previously defined as the process where increasing labor inputs,
rather than increasing land or capital, are the source of rising production. The path is characterized by an
abundance of labor, which decreases its relative factor price and allows it to develop as the focal productive
factor. Meanwhile, capital inputs are scarce and have a high opportunity cost. Land inputs are also heavily
constrained since the marginal cost of opening new land rapidly rises as land increasingly closer to the
agricultural frontier must be developed. In order to better understand the drivers of growth in a labor
intensive economy, consider the following modified Cobb-Douglas production function:

Y “ A C̄ f pT γ K β Lα q ,

(1)

where A is total factor productivity, C is a constant of climate and topographical (i.e. environmental)
conditions, T are land inputs, K are capital inputs, and L are labor inputs. α, β and γ are the output
elasticities of labor, capital, and land, respectively. Total factor productivity (TFP) refers to new techniques
and technologies for increasing output with the same level of factor inputs. Since environmental conditions
are given as constant and it was previously stated that land and capital are scarce, most of the increase in
yields in seems must come from shifts in labor or total factor productivity. An additional avenue through
which yields can be increased however is through changes in output elasticity, especially that of labor
(β ). An example of this is the creation of new fertilizers or inter-cropping methods which tend to be labor
absorbing. These techniques increase the amount of labor that can be employed with given land and capital
inputs by reducing the decline in marginal labor productivity caused by an increase in labor. This is the
”technical hairsplitting” that was mentioned by Goldenweiser (1936) and elaborated by Geertz (1963) as
part of his work on agricultural involution in Indonesia. One way, for instance, to increase rice yields is
to drain paddy area during the off season and plant it with soy beans and other nitrogen enriching crops.
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This requires greater labor inputs to the point where most of the increase in yields that come as a result of
this method are overshadowed such that average labor productivity remains constant. However, they allow
for a greater population to be employed in productive agricultural work. Geertz described these changes
as ”an effort to provide everyone with some niche, however small, in the over-all system.”
Measures of agricultural variables were taken from an agricultural survey conducted by the Japanese
government in 1933 and 1938. The purpose of the survey was to investigate the effects of a five-year plan
initiated in 1933 which sought to reorganize the peasant economy. The survey covered 220 counties and
surveyed 1919 households in total, of which 1859 completed the survey. The data was used to construct
four measures of agricultural intensity: (1) labor inputs, (2) output elasticity of labor, (3) land use, and (4)
land productivity.

3.2.1

Measure 1 — Labor Inputs

The first and most direct measure for labor intensity used in this study are labor inputs; specifically the
number of households cultivating a hectare of land, including measures for total land, paddy land, and area
used for rice cultivation. An important note is that although factor inputs are usually analyzed for their
effect on output, it is not a focus of this study if and to what extent factor inputs increase yields. Their
concentration in production is evidence enough for a labor-intensive growth path. It is not the case that
higher yields are the product of higher labor inputs. Consider the following modeled growth paths:

The figure depicts two possible growth trajectories for representative counties in the northern and
southern parts of the peninsula. The cause of their divergence are environmental factors that make it much
more difficult to increase agricultural output in the north than in the south. Therefore, though they are
both examples of labor intensive economies with comparable inputs of labor, their corresponding outputs
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Figure III: Two Growth Trajectories

and levels of labor productivity differ. Increasing labor certainly does still increase outputs, but the effect
may be much less than that of other effects that are completely outside the production process. Instead of
measuring output or labor productivity, observing labor inputs into the production process is perhaps the
most direct way to measure for agricultural intensity. However additional effects that impact labor inputs
need to be controlled for. Consider the following movement along the production function:

Figure IV: A Shift in Labor Intensity

Northern county N used to produce YN output with LN units of labor. However, in this case a nearby
factory was constructed and as a result intermediary agricultural goods became much cheaper. With the
same amount of inputs, county N is able to increase their level of labor inputs to L* and move along
their production function. However, if labor inputs are used as the measure for labor intensity, such effects
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should be controlled for in order to model only the decision to increase inputs. This also means controlling
for temperature that is likely affecting labor in the southern county. A set of controls is suggested in
subsequent sections.
Total labor inputs, that is into both paddy and non-paddy land, ranged from 1.74 households per
hectare59 in Gyeongsan County, North Gyeongsang province (0.57 hectares per household) to 0.148 households per hectare in Huchang in North Pyeongan province (6.76 hectares per household)60 . The variable
was not normally distributed, but had a distribution that appeared to be more exponential. The arithmetic
mean was 0.626 and the geometric mean was 0.553 households per hectare. Average land holding in the
south was much lower, 1.25 hectares per household,

61

than in the north where it was 2.91 hectares. As

expected, the further one travelled north the larger farm sizes one encountered (see map 2.1 for details).
Labor inputs into paddy and land cultivated with rice didn’t vary much between each other; paddy land
exceeded cultivated area by an average of a bit over 1%62 . About half of the observations for labor inputs
into paddy land ranged from 1 to 2 households per paddy (0.5 to 1 hectare of paddy per household). The
distribution displayed an even more exponential behavior that that for total land: one county in North
Pyeongan reported 21.92 households per hectare (0.46 hectares per household) of paddy. This seems to be
not an example of labor intensity so much as environmental factors preventing the spread of rice cultivation (see map 2.2 for details). The county had a relatively normal labor input of 0.247 households per acre
of total land. Though these northern counties exhibited higher labor inputs in paddy land, it is important
to reiterate that this does not mean that they experience the most labor intensity. For that to be argued,
additional effects have to be controlled for.
59 This

study assumes that differences in household composition are random, or at least not related to the extent of labor
intensity.
60 Both labor input and average land holding/farm size are reported here since they are inverses of one another.
61 Bray reported that household land holdings in the south in the post-war were generally under a hectare in size. The data
used in this study generally reflects this trend, especially in light of post-war land reform.
62 About half of areas in fact had more area used for rice cultivation than paddy. This was presumed to mean that upland rice
was being cultivated and not disaggregated from wetland rice values. Interestingly, there were many such cases in the southern
rice basket suggesting that a land frontier in rice had already been reached since labor was put into lower yielding varieties.
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3.2.2

Measure 2 — Output Elasticity

The second measure employed to explore labor intensive growth is the density of fertilizer application,
looking at both a traditional “self-produced” type and a modern fertilizer commonly purchased on the
market63 . An increase in fertilizer application is a common example of a labor-absorbing input. Yet it’s
neither an input of labor since it cannot produce anything on its own nor is it a capital input since it’s an
intermediary good used up in the production process. Moreover, it does not represent a shift in TFP which
is understood as knowledge devoid of physical inputs. While an increase in TFP would generally result in
a symmetric shift of the production curve upward, this change in the output elasticity impacts the shape of
the curve. Consider the following case:

Figure V: A Shift in Output Elasticity

Movement along the production function begins with an increase in labor from L to L*. The resulting need to employ this surplus incentivizes the introduction of labor-absorbing inputs (represented by δ ,
δ ą 1), affecting the output elasticity of labor. Labor’s output elasticity grows from β to δ β

64 .

Production

then increases from Y to Y*. This is similar to a change in TFP since the curve partially moves outward.
63 The

former was reported in weight produced while the latter in yen spent, which prevents the two measures from being
combined.
64 An output elasticity of 1 signifies constant marginal returns, while one greater than 1 represents increasing marginal returns.
Per the law of diminishing marginal returns, δ β ă 1.
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However, it moves out more relative to the amount of labor inputed into production and for this reason
needs to be differentiated from TFP change.
Maps 2.3 & 2.4 depict the spacial distribution of these fertilizers which differed significantly in
quality and usage. Purchased fertilizer averaged around 678 yen per km2 , with the highest being 4,086
yen in Gimje on the coast of North Jeolla, and the lowest being in 18 counties spread mostly between
Hamgyong and Pyeongan where it was reported that no fertilizer was purchased. This finding was one of
the main reasons why homemade fertilizer, referred to as compost, was added as an additional proxy for
fertilizer usage. It’s likely that fertilizer was used, but it was acquired outside of the market. In fact, the
average expenditure of 678 yen per km2 , or about 11.7 yen per household, was also surprisingly low65 .
Compost on the other hand averaged 9,482 kg per household, or about 0.56 kg per m2 . This seemed like an
excessive amount of compost to produce within a year, even counting the tendency of large households. It
may be that a large portion of this compost is originating from agricultural activities. All counties produced
at least some compost. The highest by far was at Pyŏktong in North Pyeongan (8.45kg{m2 ). This seems to
be an extreme outlier; the next closest to it was Namwon in North Jeolla at 1.77kg{m2 (9,916.17 pounds
per household), which seemed much more reasonable.
The distribution of fertilizer usage was heavily concentrated in the southern half of the peninsula.
North Jeolla had the highest average county value, which may also reflect its high land productivity discussed later. The distribution of compost production was similarly centered on the south. However, North
Pyeongan surprisingly had the highest average county value. This is a result of Pyŏktong’s outlier influence and most likely should be discounted. None of provinces bordering it reflect this trend. Nevertheless,
this may explain part of the story of why North Pyeongan does reasonably well in land productivity measures. Neither of the measures were normally distributed. Fertilizer displayed an exponential distribution
65 With

household income averaging around 260 yen, this seemed like a very low sum as the principal capital input in
agriculture
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while compost was left skewed.

3.2.3

Measure 3 — Land Use Ratio

The third method used to identify labor intensity was the land use ratio, or the ratio of land cultivated with
paddy over total cultivated land. Consider the following two household production functions:
Figure VI: Rice is Labor Absorbing

Household P’s only inputs of land are in the form of paddy and therefore they must only produce rice,
while household N doesn’t have any paddy land inputs and hence does not produce any rice (but instead
grows other dry grains such as wheat and legumes, including soybeans). Both households have the same
environmental constraints i. When labor is scarce, both households will have to substitute land and capital
for labor. This is advantageous to household N since their production responds well to land and capital
inputs. Relatively cheaper land ensures greater benefits from developing complex crop rotation systems.
It also means that production falls much less if fields remain fallow during the off season. Meanwhile,
household P’s production is low since there is not enough labor to take on the crucial tasks of transplanting
and weeding. Capital exists in the form of tools that can make those jobs easier, but those tools themselves
require large amounts of labor to take advantage of. By moving from a labor scarce economy to one with
a surplus in labor, household P’s production function allows it to increase output above that of household
N. This is because rice has a much higher output elasticity of labor than do comparative dry cereals. When
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a labor surplus emerges, it becomes advantageous for household N to mirror household P’s function by
transferring their labor from non-paddy to paddy land. Hence, by noting the ratio of labor put into rice
cultivation as opposed to that put towards non-paddy crops, an index of labor intensity can be established.
A particular strength of this method is that it provides a measure that displays more stability over
time than do fertilizer inputs which can vary greatly year to year. Observe the decision of household N
to convert production from non-paddy to paddy in response to a labor surplus. Labor moves to where its
marginal unit is most productive until all options procure equal yields such that:

πp

δy
δy
q“p
q,
δ LP
δ LN

(2)

where π is the relative price of the outputs, L p is paddy land and LN is non-paddy land. Equilibrium
is reached when the marginal output with respect to a marginal unit of labor in paddy land,

δy
, is
δ LP

equal to the alternative (i.e. opportunity cost) of investing labor into non-paddy land. Therefore, relative
productivities and the relative prices of each type of crop determine the level of intensity. The marginal
productivity for each type of labor is a function such that:

δy
“ f pA p, C p, Tp, L p, K p q
δ LP

(3)

δy
“ f pAN, CN, TN, LN, KN q
δ LN

(4)

T “ Tp ` TN,

L “ L p ` LN,

K “ K p ` KN

(5)

Environmental effects will impact each type of crop differently while TFP will vary depending on the
techniques and technologies used for each type of crop. Land, labor, and capital must then be distributed
between these two competing interests. Whereas capital and labor can somewhat easily shift to respond
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to market and technology changes, shifting land is the most difficult process since the land itself must be
converted to paddy in order to grow high yielding wetland rice. Changes in labor and capital inputs hence
are constricted by the amount of land that has been converted to paddy. Since the amount of labor put
into rice cultivation can vary significantly (especially in different parts of the season), the land use ratio,
or the ratio of land that has been converted to paddy is a more long-term indicator of labor intensity in
agriculture.
One issue in such a measurement is that it may pick up extensive rather than intensive growth.
Extensive growth is when increases in production are primarily due to increasing inputs of land. A classic
example of an extensive path of growth comes from Habakkuk (1962) who argued that land abundance
on the American continent coupled with relative labor scarcity encouraged the pursuit of labor-saving
strategies. A similar pattern of growth has been argued to have transpired in other sparsely populated
areas including southeast Asia. When labor supply increases, households generally have two choices on
how to best employ this labor. If labor is comparatively more scarce than land, then households will prefer
to bring new land under the plow and pursue technologies such as more advanced ploughs which allow
them to till greater areas. If land is comparably more scarce than labor, then households will prefer to
intensify their fields by converting them (in the Asian case) to paddy. If they select the former and turn
this new land into paddy, they will be increasing their land use ratio, but growth will still exhibit the
characteristics of extensiveness. As a result, the need for ”technical hairsplitting” will fall as increases in
population will simply be absorbed through increasing the amount of cultivated land. The land use ratio
hence must be reinterpreted to only consider the effects of the latter option where already cultivated land
is transformed into paddy. By holding constant for the average household farm size one can explicitly test
for the effect of land conversion rather than expansion.
Just as it did for labor, the distribution of land type depends on marginal productivities and relative
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good prices such that:
πp

δy
δy
q“p
q
δ TP
δ TN

That is, equilibrium is reached when the marginal output with respect to paddy land,

(6)
δy
, is equal to the
δ TP

alternative (i.e. opportunity cost) of investing resources into non-paddy land, TN , with the relative prices
of the outputs, π, accounted for.
Figure VII: Relative Marginal Productivity of Land

Assuming that productivity has already been adjusted by relative prices, Figure VII depicts how the land
use ratio is determined and illustrates a shift in this distribution. In the first diagram the intersection of the
marginal labor productivity of paddy and non-paddy land determines the percentage of the total cultivated
land that they make up. In the latter diagram, an exogeneous event that precipitates the fragmentation of
land into small owner-cultivator plots engenders a tenancy system which encourages risky investment into
new types of fertilizers. The result is an increase in proportion due to an exogeneous effect. Since the goal
is to simply measure the results of the decision to intensify, a set of control variables which would account
for such forces need to found in order to isolate the effect of labor intensification.
Map 2.5 depicts the provincial distribution of paddy land as a percentage of total cultivated land.
The land use ratio averaged 43.83%, with the most paddy located in Gunsan on the western coast of
North Jeolla (89.24%) with no paddy at all in the neighboring counties of Kyongwon and Musan on
the border with China in North Hamgyong. Upland rice however was harvested in Kyongwon. The
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distribution was not normal, but appeared to be more uniform with a congregation of values near the
median. Looking at the map, the distribution follows the expected spatial pattern: generally moving north
reduces the value. Provinces bordering the eastern coast also have less paddy, reflecting their mountainous
topography. Although there was no surprise that North Hamgyong had one of the lowest values, the fact
that the more southern South Pyeongan was also very low, instead of North Pyeongan or South Hamgyong,
was surprising.

3.2.4

Measure 4 — Land Productivity

Finally, land productivity serves as the fourth and final measure of the development of labor intensity.
Consider this extension to the model introduced when discussing shifts in output elasticities:
Figure VIII: Factor Productivity
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The process commences just like it did in measure 1 with an increase in labor from L to L*. The
result as it’s been shown will be an increase in the output elasticity of labor. However, this affects not only
the marginal productivity of labor, but also that of land and capital. The second model depict the increase
in labor as a result of the growth in output elasticity in terms of the trade off between factors. All three
types of factors are required in the production process, but depending on their relative cost producers can
substitute more expensive factors for less expensive ones. They do so up until the marginal productivity
of each unit (normalized for price) is equal. When the output elasticity of labor rises, more labor is
substituted for the other factors such that only the most productive factors of land and capital are utilized.
Hence, marginal land and capital productivity rises. Interestingly, marginal labor productivity rises as to
meet it as well. This makes sense since although an increase in output elasticity is not an increase in
TFP, but at high inputs of labor it behaves like one. The rise in output elasticity, allows marginal labor
productivity to decline slower, giving it a higher value at a given input level.
This observation allows labor intensity to also be measured in terms of factor productivity (when
controlled for other variables). Though marginal factor productivity is difficult to account for, average
factor productivity can be used as a substitute with only a few caveats. Namely, average productivity will
be influenced by high values of the most productive factors which do not accurately represent the factor
trade offs experienced by producers. A rapid fall in marginal productivity will take longer to become
evident when using average rates. Expressing differences in average productivity in terms of natural logs
would make analysis more sensitive towards such shifts.
Map 2.6 presents the distribution of land productivity in rice within the peninsula66 . Land productivity averaged around 28.73 koku per chō67 on the county level, ranging from the highest in Gunwi in
66 Both

paddy and upland
initially reported as to (斗) per se (畝), these were converted into the more commonly used koku (石) and chō (町)
measurements. A koku was redefined in 1891 as approximately 180 liters. A chō came to just under a hectare. Unfortunately,
comparisons to modern rice yields are impractical since those are most commonly reported as tons per hectare, while no
measurement of mass was provided by the survey. While estimates say that a koku weighted around 100 kilograms, this could
67 Though
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North Gyeongsang (45.96) to the lowest at 0 in Musan where it was previously stated that neither paddy
nor upland rice was grown. The data was not normally distributed, but left-skewed. There was some overlap between the most productive provinces and those with the highest land use ratio in Jeolla, however
the North-South divide wasn’t as dramatic than it was in the land ratio. In fact, Hwanghae and North
Pyeongan were as productive as some of the southern provinces which grew more rice.

3.2.5

An Integrated View

An additional way to look at these four measures of labor intensity is to see them as different components
of the same process. Figure IX presents an integrated view into the relation between them.

Figure IX

The framework follows Boserup’s (1965) theory that population growth fuels the process of productivity growth and adapts it to the Korean context. Population growth is what initially pushes production
out of equilibrium. Assuming that population growth is continuously occurring68 , there are two constant
forces acting upon labor: decreases in average income simply because the same income now has to be
divided among more individuals, and decreases in the marginal productivity of labor (i.e. wage) as a result
of a constant increase in the labor force. As Boserup argues, productivity growth in the pre-industrial era
occurred because of pressures to preserve existing income levels. Hence, while population growth brings
vary significantly based on cultivation methods and thus was judged not reliable enough to be reported.
68 This had been the case in Korea since the 14th century outside of declines in the aftermath of the Japanese invasions in the
late 16th century and a smaller decline in the late 18th century.
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these depressing pressures on incomes, over time it stimulates investment in skill and technology in the
struggle to preserve income levels. In the case of labor-intensive economies, this investment is focused on
labor-absorbing inputs that raise the output elasticity of labor. As it’s been show, these changes affect the
land use ratio and stimulate an increase in TFP. The result is a return to previous income and wage level.
The cycle repeats when the new higher carrying capacity of land encourages further population expansion.

3.3

Climate

An important issue that hasn’t been addressed yet are geographic constraints to agriculture. While this
study investigates the effects of agricultural intensification, one would expect the processes of intensification to manifest differently based on the environment. This has already been seen in the comparison
between intensive rice cultivation in Korea and Japan, which have more climatic and land constraints imposed upon them, and extensive growth in southeast Asia, which with its long summers and wet seasons
is an ideal place to grow rice. Such dynamics repeat themselves on the Korean Peninsula. The northern
part has a much shorter and cooler summer in addition to having less rainfall than regions in the south.
Analogous to the example on the macro-level, one would expect more intensive cultivation in the northern
part of the country. However, this may not be the case. The peninsula is already not ideal for rice culture; the less ideal parts of the region border on being physically unable to sustain a permanent rice crop.
Hence, what might be an average value for land productivity and land use ratio in some areas can be a
sign of intensification in others. Thus, the model should control for these climatic and physical factors to
find where the process of intensification is most advanced. Skill building, labor pooling, and diversification of economic activities are likely to occur sooner in areas less adapted to rice cultivation because of
resource constraints, to a certain point. Specifically, we expect that proportion of land used to grow rice
will increase as the climate becomes favorable, while average land productivity will gradually fall as it
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approaches southeast Asian levels. However, in regions beyond a certain threshold we would expect both
to fall.
We therefore control for crucial two climatic variables affecting rice cultivation: temperature and
precipitation. Elevation and slope were briefly considered as additional control variables, however, difficulties with overlaying the topographical data with the counties defined in the 1930 census prevented
evaluation of the majority of counties. Specifically, slope (i.e. the percent of land with a slope of less
than 12˝ , was calculated for 35 counties69 . For temperature, we use two different datasets. The first
comes from Willmott & Matsuura at the University of Delaware (UDEL)70 which provides a mean air
temperature averaged by month from 1900-2014. The second set comes from the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) and provides a mean air temperature for September 1930. Each of these sets
has their own strengths in this study: the UDEL study has more reference points and thus has more precise
estimates. Viewing temperatures throughout the year controls for their effects on agricultural activities in
different seasons, while averaging by month allows for discounting of extreme short-term weather events.
With this however, regions which vary widely in temperature in different times of the year will lose their
variability when being averaged. Meanwhile, the NCAR dataset focuses on one month, September 193071 .
This particular month was chosen to coincide with the typical end of the rice growing season. Changes in
temperatures here, say warmer weather, may have marginal effects on whether a second crop is harvested
and how much effort is put into it. However, using September from this single year might also unbalance
the analysis. Both sets were initially interpolated by researchers. This study then did an additional interpolation to produce measurements for all land area. For precipitation, we use data gathered by Fick &
69 Slope

data comes from the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) ALOS Global Digital Surface Model, which
publishes data on a 30 meter mesh.
70 UDel irT recipdataprovidedbytheNOAA{OAR{ESRLPSD, Boulder,Colorado,USA, f romtheirWebsiteathtt ps
:
P
A
{{www.esrl.noaa.gov{psd{
71 NCAR
community.
June
2004.
Community
Climate
System
Model,
version
3.0.
http://www.cesm.ucar.edu/models/ccsm3.0/ NCAR/UCAR. GIS data services are provided by NCAR .
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Hijmans at the University of California, Davis72 . We use data on mean total rainfall in September from
1970-2000. One county, the island of Ulleung, had to be dropped for lack of precipitation data.
As mentioned in the discussion on elevation and slope, there were difficulties overlaying county data
as a result of changes in boundaries. As a result, temperature and precipitation data was derived by locating
data at the center of the county. A future more rigorous study should look to average temperatures over
the county boundary. Map 2.1 displays the temperature distribution over the peninsula from the UDEL
study. It’s immediately striking how low these temperatures are; virtually all counties have an average
temperature below 0˝ C with the average at -7.3˝ C. An initial concern therefore was that the data was
off somehow. However, the strong correlation between the UDEL and NCAR measures suggest that, at
least within the UDEL set, temperature data is, if not accurate, at least precise. One possibility is that
this is caused by bad historical data collection. Tongyeong had the highest temperature at 0.29˝ C, while
Samsu county had the lowest at -22.16˝ C. As most climate data, the variable is not normal (P ¡ 0.001
for Shapiro-Wilk), but is left-skewed with a few very low temperatures. Since the majority are negative
values, a log transformation is impractical.
The distribution of temperatures otherwise looks like what one would expect: as one move further
north one encounters increasingly cooler temperatures. The rapid temperature decrease in the southcentral region is resolved by the fact that this is a particularly mountainous region away from warm ocean
currents. Warm currants seem to have a particular impact in the Northeast where a small band of warm
temperatures along the coast is quickly overtaken by colder temperatures stemming from winds from the
northern mountain ranges and the Manchurian plain. There are some strange temperature anomalies off
this coast, a result of heavy interpolation, but they do not impact county-level data. Warm currents also
seem to have an effect on the Southwest coast where relatively warm temperatures extend as far north as
72 Fick,

S.E. and R.J. Hijmans, 2017. Worldclim 2: New 1-km spatial resolution climate surfaces for global land areas.
International Journal of Climatology.
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Keiki. However, they don’t seem to have much of an effect on the East coast around Kogen probably as a
result of the cool air from the Taebaek mountain range.
Though the NCAR observations were also not normally distributed, spatially they created smoother
transitions (see map 2.2). This is somewhat unexpected since we predicted that a distribution from a
specific month would be much more varied than that averaged over a century. The slight decrease in
reference points may play a role here. Temperatures were much warmer than those from UDEL and
reflect what would be generally expected during the early fall. The average temperature was 17.6˝ C and
ranged from 22.35˝ C in Wando to 11.81˝ C in Chasong. Logging the temperature here is possible. We
run the regression both logged and unlogged to see whether this impacts our results.
The main difference was that spatially the coasts were much less significant in inducing temperature
variance. Temperatures were still comparably cooler compared to inland points on the same latitude, but
less significantly so. The difference is particularly visible on the Northeast coast where temperature falls a
degree or so compared to around 10 degrees in the UDEL data. The Taebaek mountains seemed to produce
no temperature effects; only did the mountains in the north cause substantially lower temperatures.
The temperature data was also very skewed, appearing to have more of a bimodal distribution than
normal. Therefore, we also run a regression with the values logged-transformed. The average precipitation
was 135.89 mm, with values ranging between 200 mm in Gangneung to just 77 mm in Samsu. The
southern and eastern coasts of the peninsula received the most rainfall, while going further inland and
north decreased precipitation. The northeastern coastline was in a higher band that other location further
inland. The least rain was up in the northern mountains where a large proportion of the precipitation would
fall as snow.

51

3.4

Additional Controls

Other variables this model controls for are are average size of household paddy land holdings, household
income, land ownership rates, manufacturing employment rates, and whether a county would be located in
North or South Korea in the partition after the war. As discussed previously, by controlling for the average
size of household paddy land, it is possible to use the land use ratio to proxy for intensive rice cultivation.
While normally a high land use ratio would mask whether growth were intensive or extensive because a
large input of land could wash out any otherwise increases in productivity provided by converting from
the alternative dry grain crop. By controlling for household paddy size, a higher proportion would indicate
intensive small scale agriculture. The largest areas of paddy land per household were found in Sukch’ŏn
county in Heian Nan (26,517 m2, or about 6.5 acres). That’s a large area, but it makes sense that it would
be located in the northern province where land was much cheaper and land ownership generally prevailed
over tenancy systems. Outside of the two already mentioned counties without any paddy, it’s surprising to
that the county with the smallest paddy per household size is Nyŏngwŏn county, also in Heian Nan (456.2
m2). The average was around 8,000 m2, or just under two acres. The average total holding was around
20,000 m2 . This is a larger area than Bray’s findings from the immediate post-war where the majority
of holdings were under a hectare (10,000 m2), however those statistics were only for South Korea. With
the north excluded, the average landholding in 1933 drops to just under 14,000 m2. Spatially, the largest
paddy plots were concentrated along the eastern and southern coasts (map 5.1). However, the overall
largest household farm plots increased as one traveled further north (map 5.2). While climate had a large
effect in reducing the amount of rice that could be planted, it also meant that larger amounts of land had
to be cultivated to sustain the population.
An additional factor in this distribution may be land ownership, which concentrated on the north
and east coast (map 5.3). Owning one own’s land made an added incentive to intensify cultivation not
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only because increasing yields would not result in higher taxes (unlike rents for tenant cultivators), but
also because they had added security that the land would not be taken away from them. This security
in investments may have also induced landowners to make longer term plans by investing into skills and
education. Land ownership is generally associated with larger household plot sizes, although the continued
existence of the small landowner is a mark of the intensive rice economy. Though values ranged greatly
(from 11%-96%), the variable was one of the only ones in this study which exhibited a normal distribution.
The average centered around 49.58%. Certainly there was polarization in the countryside as the proportion
of landless tenants grew from 44%-53% between 1926 and 193273 . However, the instance of absentee
owners appeared low.
Household income was an additional variable that needed to be taken into consideration as a confounding variable. A higher income offers both more opportunities to invest in education and greater
access to expensive capital inputs to agriculture. The highest incomes were on the west coast of the peninsula, interestingly almost mirroring land ownership rates. The lowest incomes were generally in N. and S.
Gyeongsang which bordered on some of the richest provinces. The average household income was 258.73
yen74 . The distribution of incomes appeared exponential and as the effects of income commonly decrease
as incomes grow, the natural log of the variable was used.
The manufacturing data was compiled by Jean & Paik (2017) and looks at the number of people
working in manufacturing in 1909. This variable was normalized to a rate of workers per 10,000 inhabitants. The data was heavily right skewed where a few counties centered on industrial areas such as
Tongyeong, Gimhae, and Nampo, which were not excluded, unlike other moe urban areas, from the agri73 Shin
74 The

Angus Maddison Project (2018) gives the gdp per capita in the area which would become South Korea in 1936 as
$1,135 (2011USD$). The average household income for the same area from survey data is 248.46 yen. Professor Rodney Edvinsson’s historical currency conversion tool gives the 248.46 yen approximation in 1936 as $1,254.43 (2011USD$). However,
these are supposed to be household measurements while the Maddison data is per capita. Household size was larger than it is
now. One possibility is that the survey data doesn’t include all production by cultivators, but only that which was sold on the
market.
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cultural survey. Proximity to manufacturing may entail greater access to capital inputs into the production
process as well as greater access to human capital since manufacturing would attract more innovative and
entrepreneurial workers. It could also impact household income by providing a greater market for goods,
and then influencing the ability to intensify production.

3.4.1

South Dummy

The study also introduces a special dummy variable for whether a county would become part of South
Korea after the partition at the conclusion of the Korean war. The division between the north and south
is a staple source for political scientists and economists of how political institutions can radically alter
development trajectories 75 . Though the split was certainly historical accident based on the timing of the
Soviet invasion, the idea that the northern and southern portion of the peninsula had been homogeneous
up to that point needs to be reexamined. By using this dummy variable, this study argues that the post-war
political division was roughly representative of differences in economic dynamics had caused a divergence
centuries previously between the regions. Unlike in analyzing political institutions, the border here cannot
be used as a sharp division of pre-war economic dynamics. However, the effects of border counties on
each side should balance each other out. This dummy also allows for an analysis of whether environmental
factors affected labor intensity, or whether institutional differences between north and south played a
greater role. By controlling for the dummy, one can check how strong the effects of weather were within
each region.
William Baird, one of the earliest westerners missionaries to enter this area, noted that the social
makeup of the north differed substantially from the rest of the country. The traditional Korean aristocratic
class, the yangban, was almost wholly absent from the region. There were families who had risen to
75 Acemoglu

& Johnson
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prominence, but few could claim the long distinguished heritage of the southern elite. Yi Kwangnin’s
research, in part inspired by Baird’s observations, argued that the absence of such an elite allowed for a
mercantilistic middle class to develop here further than anywhere else. Proper yangban did not engage
in trade and placed disdain on such activity. Their absence allowed Pyeongyang and other northern cities
develop as trading hubs between Korea and China, especially since wet rice cultivation proved be to be
not a sustainable source of income. Often treated as outsiders, northern merchants and educated elites
were frequently denied advancement in the political bureaucracy. The opening of schools by western
missionaries therefore gave them an opportunity to bypass what many saw as oppression by the southern
elite and gain an advantage through western education. This may have been one of the reasons why
missionaries saw their greatest advancement in this region. Clark cites isolation from the political center
and a sense of discrimination, as well the reliance on economic activity outside of agriculture, commercial
traffic in the region, and geography as the main reasons as to why missionary efforts were so much more
successful there. Moon Hwang traces these particular characteristics of the north through the region’s
distinctive history. The north had for centuries been a no man’s land outside the control of the Korean
monarchy. Marauding tribes of Jurchen, Mongols, and Manchu would exploit this to conduct raids further
south. When the construction of fortresses along the border proved ineffective, it was decided that mass
resettlement of Koreans into this vacuum would be the best way to maintain order. The resettlement,
or samin policy, began in the 15th century by moving those those who had already been living in the
border provinces further north. Some incentives for movement were first offered, but citing the lack of
volunteers, the government began to mandate resettlement. Such a requirement was waived for yangban
families, many of who began to relocate themselves to the capital to distance themselves from the stigma
of being associated with the north. In their place ”bands of soldiers, hereditary clerks, government slaves,
and criminals” were moved to the northern frontier.
This may have introduced a sense of social dynamism in the region. Red peasant groups were pri-
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marily based on the northeastern provinces and their activities often led to violent clashes with Japanese
authorities. In those regions colonial authorities were confronted on issues ranging from taxes to interference in local village structure. These red peasant groups would often set up night schools which in addition
to distributing communist and anti-imperialist literature, provided literacy education. These would often
be raided by Japanese authorities in what would sometimes become violent clashes. This was one reason
why Japanese administrators preferred assignment to the southern provinces. To encourage administrators
to take up posts in the region, an additional resettlement stipend was issued. However, it was only with
the growth of industrial activity in the 1930’s as well the extension of the railroad and strengthening of the
police presence that brought Japanese colonists to the area.
For this reason it was considered that using a south dummy would be effective in drawing out
regional and institutional dynamics that are otherwise difficult to evaluate. For one, the components of the
demand for education may differ greatly from the two regions. Education in the south was conceived as
studying the Confucian classics in order to enter the political elite and not as a method of increasing one’s
financial standing per se. In the north, entrance into the political elite was almost impossible. The strong
response to missionary educational investments then must have come from some other goal. Education
in western sciences may have been considered as a method to increase one’s earning potential. Learning
foreign languages also allowed one to engage in trade relations with foreign merchants that were making
their increasing presence known.

3.5

Checks and Relations

Several checks were performed to test for the robustness of different variables and understand the strength
of their effects on the model. First, the relationship between climate and agricultural intensification was
explored. The hypothesis was that there would be little to no relation between them. Though climates more
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supportive of rice cultivation encourage the diffusion of the crop, rice itself follows a less intensive growth
track since there is little incentive to intensify. However, this does not mean that more harsh climates will
support more intensive growth since rice will simply be unable to take root. With the peninsula’s great
diversity of climate one would expect the two trends to cancel each other out. Hence, while the three
climate variables were significant and positively correlated with the land use ratio (explaining more than
50% of its variance), their ability to do so with land productivity was minimal with precipitation being
completely insignificant, UDEL marginally insignificant, and NCAR being significant, but explaining
only a small amount of the variation. They were however significant in predicting fertilizer (positive
correlation), but marginally so for compost density.
What’s interesting to note is that the climate controls also had a significant effect on literacy rates,
but the effects appeared inverted between the two sexes. For male literacy rates, UDEL, NCAR, and
Precipitation were each significant and negatively correlated. However, the exact opposite was true for
female rates, although the effect was much weaker. Since these climate conditions are unlikely to be the
actual cause behind changes in literacy rates, it’s likely that this is due to long term institutional differences
between northern and southern Korea. Literacy rates as noted previously were spatially split. In fact, every
time the South dummy was added as a control, the climate variables become insignificant in predicting
either female or male literacy rates. In some cases the sign of the relationship changed. On account of
this, more work was done exploring the South dummy. It was discovered that outside of having an effect
on each respective sex’s literacy rate and on climate, the dummy also showed a significant and substantial
divide on total plot size (but not paddy plot size) and fertilizer usage (positive) between the north and south.
This dummy can also show whether an effect in being predominantly carried by processes occurring only
in one part of the peninsula and therefore is employed in the multivariate regression model.
The relationship between income, literacy, and agricultural intensity was also considered. Income
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was positively correlated and explained some of the variability in literacy rates for both sexes. The effect
however was about three times stronger for male than female literacy such that a 1% increase in income
correlated with a 0.01% increase in male literacy rates. While this might not seem substantial, variance in
income was much greater than in literacy. Movement from the lowest income county to the highest income
one in fact would cause a predicted doubling in male literacy rates from 36% to 72%. This stronger effect
is expected since families, given surplus income, would traditionally first invest in education for their male
children and then for females. Hence, a smaller proportion of an increase in income would go to female
education. Income was not significant in predicting the land use ratio and though it was significant in the
case of land productivity, the relationship did not have strong explanatory power. However, income was
able to predict a good amount of the variation in fertilizer usage and the two were positively correlated.
Before the multivariate model was run, the relations between the main independent intensity variables and literacy rates were examined. For Male literacy rates, only one of the three measures were
significant and substantial, though not in the direction initially predicted. In the first measure, by holding
the land use ratio constant and examining land productivity, the explanatory variable is shown to not be
significant. However, land use ratio is highly significant and negative. This was seen earlier in the bivariate
regression between the two and stems from land productivity not being significant. This same trend fueled
the second finding: holding paddy size constant, land use still continued to have a negative correlation with
male literacy. Though paddy size was significant, including it in fact strengthened the negative response
of land use to male literacy. Neither fertilizer usage or compost were significant.
The relations for female literacy rates were much closer to what was expected. Controlling for
land use, land productivity had a significant and substantial relation with female literacy - an increase in
land productivity by one unit contributed to a 2.46% rise in literacy. Thus, a county with the lowest land
productivity (9 koku/cho), by moving to the same level as the highest (46 koku/cho) would more than
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double female literacy from 3.6%-8.8%. In the second measure, by controlling for farm size, land use was
found to be positive and statistically significant. The elasticity between measures was found to be 0.27,
meaning that a 1% change in the land use ratio was associated with a 0.27% change in literacy. Excluding
counties without any paddy at all, movement from the lowest to the highest ratio, while keeping the same
farm size, was associated with over a tripling in literacy from 3.4%-11.2%. As expected, farm size was not
significant. Finally, fertilizer usage, when controlling for farm size, was also significant, corresponding to
a positive growth in literacy. Excluding countries where no fertilizer was reported to have been purchased,
an increase from the lowest to the highest density of fertilizer usage (while keeping farm size constant)
was predicted to result in an almost quadrupling of literacy rates from 6.5%-22.5%. Of course one doesn’t
simply shift all of their production to rice, especially if they had been stuck at a very low equilibrium
where only 10% of their crop share was rice. Moreover, simply changing production overnight will not
suddenly cause female literacy to rise. Still, being nudged from this lower to a higher equilibrium may
overtime fuel a stronger demand for education,

4

Multivariate Regressions
4.0.1

Measure 1 — Labor Inputs

M ULTIVARIATE R EGRESSION M ODEL
Yits “ β0 ` β1 Litc ` β2 Xi ` β3 LnpIqit ` β4 T Sit `5 TYit ` β6 PSit ` β7 Oit ` β8 INDit ` ε
H0 : β1 “ 0
H1 : β1 ‰ 0
The question of whether labor intensification has an effect on literacy rates is taken up by this model
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by representing labor intensity as labor input, or the number of households cultivating a hectare of land. An
OLS cross-sectional regression was conducted using labor input as the independent variable and 7 control
variables including one dummy. Yits represents literacy rates in county i at time t for sex s. Litc represents
labor inputs in county i at time t for category c (total land, paddy land, and rice land). The controls
are logged household income (I), the three climate controls average temperature for September (T S),
temperature for the year (Y S), & average precipitation in September (PS), the degree of landownership
(O), and the extent of industrial development (INDq.
In constructing this model, the null hypothesis is that land intensity will have no effect on literacy
rates, while the alternative is that there is some effect such that the coefficient does not equal zero. It’s
predicted that land intensity will in fact positively correlate with literacy even after controls are added
such that it has an independent effect on it. While having three possible measures of land inputs presents
additional opportunities, there isn’t information available to how many individuals worked or how many
hours were put into each category of land, making interpreting categories that are subsections of total
land difficult. In theory, paddy should show a stronger relationship than total land, and regressing with
land actually used for rice cultivation should produce an even stronger effect since each of those areas
are progressively smaller areas that would require more intensive work. However, without knowing the
distribution of labor to each type of land, such an analysis is hard to argue. A small patch of paddy
land that’s mostly ignored might be part of a larger primarily-soy bean producing county sustaining many
households, yet in this measure it would seem that the paddy were intensely cultivated. Knowing the land
use ratio and using it as a control when regressing with the paddy and rice measurements should prevent
such misrepresentations from occurring.
One question raised was whether to log transform the literacy measure. Doing so would certainly
bring the distribution closer to being normal. Differences between counties might be better highlighted

Table 1.1: Labor Inputs (Male)
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Table 1.2: Labor Inputs (Female)
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when examining proportional, rather than absolute, differences between them. However, the relation
between different counties appeared more linear than exponential (although the highest quartile of female
rates were distributed exponentially). Hence, the main regressions were done without log transforming the
dependent variable. In a few examples however the results with the dependent variable log transformed
will be noted if an interesting relationship is revealed by it. An additional issue was where the significance
threshold α would be set. Though setting it at 0.05 is common in order to minimize the probability of a
type one error, using historical data presents substantial difficulties in terms of the statistical noise that’s
often a part of the data. Issues in copying, translating, measuring, and verifying information were much
more substantial then than in the age of modern data. In consideration of this an a desire not to allow a
type two error to occur on account of this noise, an α of 0.10 was used.
Tables 1.1&1.2 report the results for both male and female literacy, respectively. While the measure
of intensity that included total land worked was not a significant predictor of either male or female literacy,
measures that narrowed in on paddy and rice land were significant, allowing the null hypothesis to be
rejected. However, while the relationship with male literacy was positive, it was negative with female
rates. Both effects were not very substantial. Increasing labor input by an additional household per hectare
of paddy corresponded with a 0.6 percentage point increase in male literacy (1.47% increase when logged)
while also being associated with a decrease in female literacy of 0.3 percentage points (4.79% decrease
when logged)76 . The effects when accounting for cultivated rice area were similar, but slightly weaker.
The reason why paddy and rice land were significant as opposed to total land was probably due to the fact
that they require more labor and thus are more sensitive to decisions to intensify.

Uncontrolled for Divergence Between North & South The South dummy was consistently highly
significant for both sexes, but it was negative in the case of male literacy and positive for female. This is
76 An

additional household per acre paddy would be the equivalent of moving from about the 25th to the 75th percentile of
counties, or from around the 75th to the 90th percentile.
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not surprising since it’s already been noted that male literacy was much higher in the north and female in
the south. However, its persistence in columns (6) & (7) shows that outside of income, land intensity, land
tenancy patterns, and industry effects that affected the north and south literacy levels locally, there were
other factors causing this spacial separation in literacy rates.

Higher Labor Intensity in Northern Rice Culture

Since overall labor inputs were lower in the north

(based on larger farm sizes) where male literacy rates were also higher, one would expect the relationship
between labor inputs and male literacy to be inverse. However in the case of paddy and rice land, labor
inputs actually increased in the north since paddy land was much sparser. Hence it would make sense that
there would be a positive correlation with male and a negative one with female literacy. One concern is
that smaller paddy fields in areas of higher male literacy aren’t actually seeing high labor inputs. That is, if
the distribution of hours of work put into the paddy field as compared to dry crops were available, it would
show that the vast majority of work in such regions (i.e. the north) was going into dry crops, voiding the
findings from this model. Yet the relationship continued to be significant even after being controlled for
environmental conditions. Regions with the same climate would have little reason to not put the same
amount of labor into each type of crop, or at the least these differences should balance out. The fact the
relationship was still significant after the land ratio control meant that, at least when comparing within the
north and south, those who put more labor into similar environmental conditions and land ratios were able
to earn an unexpected return in education. Table 1.3 shows that labor intensity of inputs prevailed more in
the north.
TABLE 1.3

Labor Intensity Correlated with Lower Female Literacy

This finding goes against this study’s hy-

pothesis and raises the question of whether male and female literacy rates depend on different factors.
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(1)
Labor Paddy
South
Land Ratio
Income
Temp Sept
Temp Yearly
Precip Sept
Own Land
Industry

-1.244˚˚˚
-5.191˚˚˚
-1.083˚˚˚
0.293˚˚
-0.0807
0.0218˚˚
-0.797
-0.00182

Observations
R2

203
0.364

(-2.71)
(-6.09)
(-3.00)
(2.12)
(-1.06)
(2.54)
(-0.71)
(-0.19)

t statistics in parentheses
˚
p ă 0.10, ˚˚ p ă 0.05, ˚˚˚ p ă 0.01

This issue was raised earlier when a bivariate regression of both rates found no correlation. Analyzing
this through labor inputs shows a few theories that can be explored. Higher labor inputs generally mean
smaller household landholdings and a more densely packed population. In such a competitive environment, constrained families may believe that putting all of their educational investments into male children
would provide the best opportunity for social and economic advancement. Moreover, while households
may become ”pluri-active”, labor itself may become more specialized by gender. Tangental evidence on
gender dynamics comes from the successful appeal the Christian missionaries had on Korean women.
During the surge of membership in the Great Revival of 1907, Korean ”biblewomen” were sought for
their ability to make contact with ”respectable Korean women.”77 . Women’s education soon became an
joint effort by western and Korean missionaries who opened up schools, bible institutes, and seasonal
institutes for farm women to attend in the city in the Korean northwest. Pyongyang would soon be called
the ”Jerusalem of the East” in no small part due to the work biblewomen did to bring Christianity into the
home.78 Such success was not found in the southern half of the country, though much of this may have
been due to weariness of outside influences.
77 Clark,244
78 Ibid,245
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Owning Land and Lower Literacy

The Own Land variable did not behave in the way it was expected

to. Though land ownership was more widespread in the north, it had a negative influence on both male &
female literacy rates and on labor inputs. Though economic principle would argue that it is ”proverbial that
the man who holds a stake in the land he tills is more enterprising...than the tenant”79 , tilling one own’s
land appeared to be a sign of illiteracy. Land ownership’s addition to the model reduced the significance
of total labor inputs for predicting female literacy (Table 1.2, Column 5) and made their effect completely
insignificant for male literacy (Table 1.1, Column 5). This suggests that much of the inverse correlation
between labor inputs in total land and male literacy originates in the direct relation between landownership
and labor inputs. However, land ownership was not a significant predictor for male rates when controlled
for inputs to either paddy or rice land (Table 1.1, Columns 6 & 7). This made it difficult to evaluate its
overall effects on the measurement. However, it was significant in predicting female rates using any of the
three labor input measurements. Since the relation between landholding and female literacy was negative,
and the relation between labor inputs and female literacy was also negative, the relation between land
ownership and labor inputs should be positive.
Figure X
Paddy Labor

`

Land Ownership

´

´

Literacy

This was not what was expected as owning one own’s land should provide the economic security
to proceed with investments in education, but made sense in the context of the times. Being a period of
economic downturn, many families were induced to sell large tracts of their land in the 1930’s. It may be
79 Hamilton
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the case that regions in which fewer families had to sell their land were not richer, but less connected to
the new global economy. In exchange for minimizing the commercialization of their crops, households in
these regions were able to keep in place a greater portion of the old land regime. They may be have been
less accessible and had a higher preference for a traditional social structure and therefore been skeptical
on the idea of women’s literacy. Following measures will hopefully shed more light on these issues.

4.0.2

Measure 2 — Complementary Goods

M ULTIVARIATE R EGRESSION M ODEL
Yit s = β0 ` β1 Fitc ` β2 Xi ` β3 LnpIqit ` β4 T Sit `5 TYit ` β6 PSi ` β7 Oit ` β8 INDit ` ε
H0 : β 1 = 0
H1 : β 1 ‰ 0
The question of whether labor intensification has an effect of literacy rates is taken up by this model
by representing labor intensity as the addition of labor-absorbing complementary goods, or more specifically the density of fertilizer usage. An OLS cross-sectional regression was conducted using an independent variable for labor intensity and 7 control variables including one dummy variable. Yits represents
literacy rates in county i at time t for sex s. Fitc represents fertilizer inputs in county i at time t for category c (self-produced or ”compost” and market bought or ”fertilizer”). The controls are logged household
income (I), the three climate controls average temperature for September (T S), temperature for the year
(Y S), & average precipitation in September (PS), the degree of landownership (O), and the extent of industrial development (INDq. In constructing this model, the null hypothesis is that fertilizer usage will
have no effect on literacy rates, while the alternative is that there is some effect such that the coefficient
does not equal zero.
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The effects of the fertilizers are similar in that they both are intermediary goods that increase the
marginal productivity of labor my shifting its output elasticity. One way to conceptualize the difference
between them is in terms of TFP change. The new fertilizers that the Japanese were exporting and creating in agricultural experimentation stations was a crucial component in raising yields in Korea during
the colonial era. In this way, usage of the two fertilizers can be thought of as representing two steps
within the labor-intensive path of development beginning with labor-absorbing inputs and transitioning to
productivity-enhancing ones. An important question to ask is whether this fertilizer is being applied to
rice or to other crops and whether one would expect a different effect on literacy based on this decision.
It would naturally make most sense to apply fertilizer to the higher yielding and greater labor absorbing
crop. Adding the land use ratio as an additional control would be one way to get at this question.
Tables 2.1 & 2.2 report the results for both male and female literacy, respectively. The study found
that through there was no effect of fertilizer density on male literacy rates, there was a significant correlation between it and female literacy. The correlation was such that an additional 1, 000 yen expenditure
on market purchased fertilizer per km2 of cultivated land was associated with a 1 percentage point increase in female literacy. This may appear to not be a substantial relationship, especially when the average
household income is around 260 yen. However, a square kilometer of cultivated land is a substantial areas
consisting of 100 hectares and an average of 63 households’ farm area. Hence, with each family funding an additional 15.87 yen, the associated benefit in female literacy would on average amount of one
percentage point. This is substantial considering that 5 percentage points separate the county at the 25th
percentile from the one at the 75th. However, since only in one out of four cases was the coefficient statistically significant, we cannot reject the null that there is no effect of fertilizer usage on literacy. The effect
of fertilizer was initially more than twice as significant. However controlling for income unsurprisingly
decreased its effect drastically (Table 2.2, Column 2).The same pattern occurred for male literacy, but the
result was that the fertilizer measurement lost all significance (Table 2.1, Column 2).

Table 2.1: Complementary Inputs (Male)
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Table 2.2: Complementary Inputs (Female)
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70
Labor Inputs Promote Male & Complementary Inputs Promote Female Literacy

Noting these re-

sults in relation to those from the first measure, it’s interesting to find that the relationship between fertilizer
usage and female literacy is analogous to the relationship between labor inputs and male literacy in the first
measure. That is, while labor inputs had a significant and positive effect on male literacy, complementary
labor inputs are significant and positive for female literacy. This may be due to incentives related to the
production function. Consider that the marginal product of labor begins growth at an increasing rate. The
rate of growth then decreases as labor is employed in increasingly less productive tasks until it begins its
approach to zero. Supposing then that decreases in marginal labor productivity have begun to set in and
the decision of whether to have women work in the field is brought into consideration by the household.
Certainly there is still a need to gather all available labor during the harvest season as labor productivity
rises significantly. However, during the rest of the year a separation of occupations based on sex will more
likely occur. However, the addition of labor complementary inputs raises the output elasticity of labor,
causing marginal productivity to both rise faster and decline slower than it would have otherwise. In such
a scenario, the benefit of including more household members in the cultivation process rises.

Tenancy Encourages Transition to New Fertilizer

Land ownership was again a significant predictor

of literacy rates for both sexes, allowing for its effects on labor intensity to be investigated further. As
was discovered in the previous measure, land ownership had an inverse relationship with literacy rates, but
a direct one with land intensity (labor inputs). In terms of fertilizer usage however, the relationship was
more complex.
TABLE 2.3
As table 2.3 shows, landownership encouraged the usage of self-produced fertilizer (compost) just as it
was associated with higher labor inputs, but it discouraged the adoption of modern fertilizer inputs. As
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(1)
Ln(Compost)
Own Land
South
Income
Temp Sept
Industry
Labor Paddy
Land Use

0.635˚
0.346˚˚˚
´0.143
0.0764˚˚˚
´0.000759
0.0120
0.197

Observations
R2

190
0.368

(1.89)
(2.68)
(´1.33)
(2.94)
(´0.28)
(0.40)
(0.71)

(2)
Ln(Fertilizer)
´1.194˚˚
0.0346
1.036˚˚˚
0.217˚˚˚
0.00783˚˚
´0.179˚˚˚
0.730˚

(´2.51)
(0.19)
(6.77)
(5.89)
(2.01)
(´4.20)
(1.86)

190
0.664

t statistics in parentheses
˚
p ă 0.10, ˚˚ p ă 0.05, ˚˚˚ p ă 0.01

argued in the previous measure, it may be the case that those who continued to own the land they tilled
into the 1930’s were economically disconnected from the global market. They were still labor intensive
cultivators, but were divorced from many of the technological changes occurring around them. Moreover,
though a shift to a new fertilizer is closer to a change in TFP, the fertilizer is still a labor-absorbing input
affecting output elasticity. As discussed above, a change in output elasticity may be more advantageous to
women actively participating in labor-intensive growth.

4.0.3

Measure 3 — Land Use Ratio

M ULTIVARIATE R EGRESSION M ODEL
Yit s = β0 ` β1 LRit ` β2 FS ` β3 Xi ` β4 LnpIqit ` β5 T Sit `6 TYit ` β7 PSi ` β8 Oit ` β9 INDit ` ε
H0 : β 1 = 0
H1 : β 1 ‰ 0
The question of whether labor intensification has an effect of literacy rates is taken up by this model
by representing labor intensity as the land use ratio or more specifically the percentage of paddy land
cultivated of all cultivated land. An OLS cross-sectional regression was conducted using an independent
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variable for labor intensity and 8 control variables including one dummy variable. Yits represents literacy
rates in county i at time t for sex s. LRit represents the land use ratio in county i at time t. The controls
are farm size (FSq, the south dummy (S), logged household income (I), the three climate controls average
temperature for September (T S), temperature for the year (Y S), & average precipitation in September (PS),
the degree of landownership (O), and the extent of industrial development (INDq. In constructing this
model, the null hypothesis is that fertilizer usage will have no effect on literacy rates, while the alternative
is that there is some effect such that the coefficient does not equal zero.
Tables 3.1 & 3.2 report the results for both male and female literacy, respectively. The land ratio was
significant in predicting male literacy rates such that movement from cultivating no rice to only growing
rice corresponded to an 8 percentage point (or a 20.95% when logged) increase in male literacy. Movement
from the 25th to the 75th percentile still offered a substantial increase of 8.14%. However, the land use
ratio was unable to predict female literacy rates (Table 3.2, Column 5). Therefore, while the null hypothesis
can be rejected in the case of male literacy, this cannot be done for female literacy as further research needs
to be conducted. Thankfully, the cause of this differentiated effect is easy to locate. The addition of land
ownership was the main cause of the land ratio’s decline in predicative power. Land ownership did not
have the same effect in the model with male literacy, confirming the evidence from previous measures
that higher rates of land ownership particularly affect female literacy rates. However, unlike in previous
measurements land ownership was inversely correlated with the labor intensity statistic. This means that
regardless of climate, income, or spacial reference, those who cultivated their own land avoided converting
it to paddy. Returning the relation to its historical context, one can again see the effects of the 1930’s
economic slump. With a global collapse in rice prices, those who had converted a larger portion of their
land to rice to sell on this market had the most to lose.

Table 3.1: Land Use Ratio (Male)
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Table 3.2: Land Use Ratio (Female)
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Focus of Growth Was Intensive, Not Extensive

The major concern of using the land ratio as a proxy

for labor intensive growth was that proportion could be increased extensively by expanding land inputs.
However, the addition of farm size as a control did not substantially change the effect of land ratio. While
the model is still controlling for farm size to examine intensive growth, the fact that the land ratio doesn’t
change much means that there is not much extensive growth happening. Another possibility is that what
extensive growth is happening is, as one would expect, not affecting literacy rates.
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4.0.4

Measure 4 — Land Productivity

M ULTIVARIATE R EGRESSION M ODEL
Yit s = β0 ` β1 LPit ` β2 LRit ` β3 Xi ` β4 LnpIqit ` β5 T Sit `6 TYit ` β7 PSi ` β8 Oit ` β9 INDit ` ε
H0 : β 1 = 0
H1 : β 1 ‰ 0
The question of whether labor intensification has an effect of literacy rates is taken up by this model
by proxying labor intensity as a measure of land productivity or more specifically the amount of rice
yields per area planted. An OLS cross-sectional regression was conducted using an independent variable
for labor intensity and 8 control variables including one dummy variable. Yits represents literacy rates in
county i at time t for sex s. LPit represents labor productivity in county i at time t. LRit represents the land
use ratio in county i at time t. The remaining controls the south dummy (S), logged household income
(I), the three climate controls average temperature for September (T S), temperature for the year (Y S), &
average precipitation in September (PS), the degree of landownership (O), and the extent of industrial
development (INDq. In constructing this model, the null hypothesis is that land productivity will have no
effect on literacy rates, while the alternative is that there is some effect such that the coefficient does not
equal zero.
Tables 4.1 & 4.2 report the results for both male and female literacy, respectively. While land productivity wasn’t a significant predictor for male literacy rates, it was significant for female rates such
that an increase in yields of one koku/cho was associated with a 0.124 percentage point (or 1.99% when
logged). This was a moderately significant effect since productivity measures ranged from 9 to as higher
as 45 koku/cho. Movement from the lowest to the highest productivity is associated then with a 4.34
percentage point increase in female literacy rates, or movement from the 25th to a bit under the 75the per-
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centile. For this reason the null hypothesis in the case of female literacy is rejected. When discussing the
effect of labor absorbing practices on land productivity, it was argued that an increase in labor absorption
capabilities would cause marginal land productivity to increase. Since the previous measures have shown
that labor absorbing processes had a greater effect on female literacy rates it is to be expected that land
productivity will follow a similar pattern.

Table 4.1: Land Productivity (Male)
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Table 4.2: Land Productivity (Female)
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5

Conclusion

This study showed that labor intensity, particularly in rice cultivation, had an effect on rural literacy rates
during the Japanese colonial era, though the effects were highly differentiated by sex. Counties that engaged in labor absorbing practices particularly saw increases in female literacy. However, impact of these
findings go beyond the colonial rural context. As mass urbanization radically shifted the demographic
patterns of post-war South Korea, the social structures, values, and practices of the rural rice cultivator
were transferring to a new modern urban context. Yet culture persists, and as the country positioned itself
as a exporter of complex manufactured goods, it was able to tap into a workforce with high human capital
accustomed to investing into skills. The northern half of the country, once poised to be the engine of
growth for the peninsula, saw ruin of its economic and human capital infrastructure. Leading regions of
labor intensive cultivation were encouraged to replace labor inputs with capital in one of the egregious
attempts to impose foreign economic frameworks on a system that had been previously full of vitality.
For development, research into theories of induced and labor intensive development showcase the need
to adapt economic theory to the institutional context. This doesn’t necessarily mean a re-working of the
basic theory. In fact, the idea that people respond to incentives continues to be the pillar of any sound
economic intervention and in many contexts has not been carried far enough to examine decision-making
processes (this study explored such thinking on the topic of education). Future interventions to raise education should examine the issue from both the supply and the demand side to better understand just how
interrelated different sectors of the economy are.
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6
6.1

Appendix
Figures
Figure 1.1: Colonial Investments in Education

Figure 1.2: Colonial Investments in Education
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Figure 2.1: Cross-Check Literacy, Combined

Figure 2.2: Cross-Check Literacy, Female
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Figure 2.3: Cross-Check Literacy, Male

6.2

Maps
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Map 1.1: Literacy Rate, Male (1930)
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Map 1.2: Literacy Rate, Female (1930)
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Map 1.3: Literacy Rate, Combined (1930)

87

Map 2.1: Total Plot Size

Figure 1: The inverse can be used to measure labor input.
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Map 2.2: Paddy Plot Size

Figure 2: The inverse can be used to measure labor input.
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Map 2.3: ”Self-Produced Fertilizer”
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Map 2.4: Market Purchased Fertilizer
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Map 2.5: Land Use Ratio
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Map 2.6: Land Productivity (Rice)

